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ARTICLES
A LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE SOVEREIGN
CITIZEN MOVEMENT
Caesar Kalinowski IV*
“A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. It may also prove costly.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2016, armed antigovernment protesters led by Ammon Bundy
occupied the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Harney County, Oregon,
to challenge the federal government’s control over public lands.2 By Febru-
ary, federal and state law enforcement officers had arrested or killed all
members of the group; those arrested were later charged with a number of
federal offenses.3 At trial, the defendants claimed that the United States did
not have jurisdiction over the wildlife refuge.4 Despite a 1935 Supreme
Court opinion holding otherwise, the defendants argued that the state of
Oregon was the true owner of the land since its incorporation.5 By October,
an Oregon jury acquitted Bundy and the others of the federal conspiracy
and weapons charges against them—a result many believe can be explained
* Caesar Kalinowski IV is a commercial litigator with Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, as well as an
avid First Amendment and federalism supporter. Caesar wishes to thank Jenny Mendoza, Benjamin
Nelson, Kaleigh Powell, and Donald Netolitzky for their invaluable feedback and assistance; and his
wife and son for their endless support.
1. Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 993 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1993).
2. Harrison Berry, Militia Group Seizes Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters, BOISE
WEEKLY (Jan. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/VMW6-WYHS.
3. Steven Dubois, Ammon Bundy, Others Face New Charges in Oregon Standoff, STATESMAN
JOURNAL (Mar. 9, 2016, 5:09 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/HV2G-FS6H.
4. Ammon Bundy Offered Guilty Plea if Armed Oregon Protesters Were Let Go, RT QUESTION
MORE (Apr. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/RMW9-2V7A.
5. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 29 (1935).
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only as jury nullification.6 While some believe that the underlying basis for
the group’s claims have far-reaching implications for the meaning and
foundation of the federal government’s power, in reality, groups like
Bundy’s simply misread, misconstrue, and misunderstand the United States
Constitution.
The defendants’ assertions are not new. They are simply the most re-
cent example of a pervasive movement involving unique views on the con-
stitutionality of the United States’ jurisdiction and ability to punish or tax
its citizens. While the various groups have differing names and ideologies,
the vast majority in the United States7 can be classified as “Sovereign Citi-
zens.”8 The FBI describes Sovereign Citizens as “anti-government extrem-
ists who believe that even though they physically reside in this country,
they are separate or ‘sovereign’ from the United States.”9 Evolving from “a
combination of four different movements: the Tax Protester movement, the
Posse Comitatus, the Patriot movement, and Common-Law Courts,”10 the
Sovereign Citizen movement began in the 1960s and gained adherents well
into the 1990s. Following the economic downturn of 2008, the movement
saw a resurgence.11 In fact, despite no unifying leader or firmly established
tenets, the Southern Poverty Law Center estimates that there are over
300,000 Sovereign Citizens in America today.12 Although this number has
been called into question,13 the fact remains that thousands of adherents
exist.
Most often, Sovereign Citizens contest the United States’ jurisdiction
over them as federal defendants because they have not consented to that
jurisdiction. In pursuing their “rights,” Sovereign Citizens engage in “paper
6. Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in Takeover of Oregon Wildlife
Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/D23F-Q87S.
7. This phenomenon is not limited to the United States, and many common law nations have their
own version of Sovereign Citizens. See Donald Netolitzky, A Pathogen Astride the Minds of Men: The
Epidemiological History of Pseudolaw, CEFIR SYMPOSIUM: SOVEREIGN CITIZENS IN CANADA (May 3,
2018), https://perma.cc/ WXT9-L39D; see also Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (Can.).
8. For a comprehensive overview of the various groups’ origins and beliefs, see Michael Mas-
trony, Common-Sense Responses to Radical Practices: Stifling Sovereign Citizens in Connecticut, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1013, 1017–20 (2016); Joshua P. Weir, Sovereign Citizens: A Reasoned Response to the
Madness, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 829, 836 (2015).
9. Domestic Terrorism, The Sovereign Citizen Movement, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Apr. 13, 2010), https://perma.cc/L8SQ-2K42 [hereinafter Domestic Terrorism].
10. Mastrony, supra note 8, at 1017.
11. See Stephen A. Ken, Freemen, Sovereign Citizens, and the Challenge to Public Order in British
Heritage Countries, EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF CENTRES OF RESEARCH AND INFORMATION ON SECTARI-
ANISM (May 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/7NLV-PZPP (arguing that there appears to be a link between
broader applications of pseudolaw and economic stress).
12. Sovereign Citizens Movement, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, https://perma.cc/Z7RG-
83QR.
13. See Michelle Mallek, Uncommon Law: Understanding and Quantifying the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL (2016), https://perma.cc/4E8V-38U9.
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terrorism,” which includes the filing of false liens against government offi-
cials and a multitude of other civil claims based on abstract violations of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).14 These tactics impose tremendous
hardship on civil servants, both in terms of “monetary expenditures and of
staff psychological stress.”15
Sometimes conflicts between Sovereign Citizens and the government
end in bloodshed.16 The 2010 West Memphis police shooting involving
Jerry and Joseph Kane is but one gruesome example of the Sovereign Citi-
zen philosophy escalating to violence.17 Due to increasing attacks, the FBI
has classified the movement as a “domestic terrorist threat,” finding that
members “[c]ommit murder and physical assault; [t]hreaten judges, law en-
forcement professionals, and government personnel; [i]mpersonate police
officers and diplomats; [u]se fake currency, passports, license plates, and
driver’s licenses; and [e]ngineer various white-collar scams[.]”18 Noting a
significant shift, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Analysis Section believes that
some Sovereign Citizens are moving from “reacting to law enforcement
scrutiny to targeting police officers[,] indicat[ing] an increased interest in
harassing and intimidating police [that] may lead to potentially hostile con-
frontations.”19 In fact, in a recent comprehensive survey of law enforcement
agencies, law enforcement officers perceived Sovereign Citizens to be a
more serious terrorist threat than Islamic extremists.20
Although identifying the tactics used by the Sovereign Citizen move-
ment is fairly easy, succinctly defining its beliefs and aims can be exceed-
ingly difficult. Sovereign Citizens have no leader, no central repository for
ideas, and no unifying collective mission. Most adherents get their informa-
tion through nebulous webpages or YouTube videos. Generally, Sovereign
14. David Fleishman, Paper Terrorism: The Impact of the “Sovereign Citizen” on Local Govern-
ment, 27 PUB. L.J., no. 2, Spring 2004, at 7, https://perma.cc/KLF7-AFC4.
15. Fleishman, Paper Terrorism, supra note 14, at 7. R
16. Amir Vera, Waffle House Shooter Was Once Arrested by Secret Service for Trespassing Near
White House, CNN (Apr. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/HF2G-XTVX (Waffle House shooter Travis
Reinking); Jason Wilson, New Documents Suggest Las Vegas Shooter Was Conspiracy Theorist—What
We Know, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/47SU-2DN2 (Las Vegas shooter Stephen
Paddock); Gavin Long, Baton Rouge Gunman, Was a Sovereign Citizen, NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/7DEA-CE3D (Baton Rouge shooter Gavin Long).
17. Dan Harris, Deadly Arkansas Shooting by “Sovereigns” Jerry and Joe Kane Who Shun U.S.
Law, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2010), https://perma.cc/A5FZ-GX55.
18. Domestic Terrorism, supra note 9. R
19. Recent Sovereign Citizen Extremist Targeting of Law Enforcement Highlights Potential for
Violence During Traffic Stops, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/
R9QX-C9X9.
20. See David Carter, Steve Chermak, Jeremy Carter, & Jack Drew, Understanding Law Enforce-
ment Intelligence Processes: Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Di-
rectorate, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2014), https://perma.cc/WCJ4-
TJYM.
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Citizens believe that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution created
a second form of citizenship that “enslaved” or created a contract with the
population under a federal corporation.21 An extension of this belief asserts
that the United States went bankrupt in 1933 and subsequently, the govern-
ment “borrowed” collateral by using the future earnings of citizens to back
its currency.22 As part of these beliefs, members seek to “disassociate” or
“divest” the “legally fictional persons” from their “natural persons” to re-
move the United States’ jurisdiction and financially take advantage of their
inherent sovereignty.23
One could easily dismiss these claims as conspiracy theories, but such
a terse response would betray one important point: the Sovereign Citizen
movement is made up of thousands of U.S. citizens that distrust the federal
government and are actively trying to limit its power through reference to
the Constitution. Although their means run the gamut from frivolous to
downright dangerous, the Sovereign Citizen movement is growing by the
day.24
For the judges, prosecutors, and civil servants that regularly engage
with these groups, dealing with incoherent legal arguments can be daunting.
Sovereign Citizens’ arguments do not follow traditional legal logic, yet they
need to be coherently addressed. Consolidating the claims alone can be ex-
tremely difficult,25 as a lack of uniformity in beliefs as well as differing
“interpretations” makes pinning down the actual doctrine nearly impossible.
Perhaps because of this conundrum, courts and public servants interacting
with Sovereign Citizens generally dismiss Sovereign Citizens’ claims as
meritless without examining or explaining why.26 Because “[w]e live in a
21. Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Jan. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/H4J7-3ZU8.
22. Sovereign Citizen Movement: Extremists Claim to be “Beyond the Law”, REGIONAL ORGAN-
IZED CRIME INFORMATION CENTER SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT (2010), https://perma.cc/X5U4-A6XM.
23. See Paul Davies & Kirk Rutter, Meet Your Strawman 3:30–3:56, YOUTUBE (June. 19, 2010),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rGyqDkqSXI (last visited Feb. 16, 2019); Intelligence
Rep. Staff, New Multi-Million Dollar Scam Takes Off in Antigovernment Circles, SOUTHERN POVERTY
LAW CENTER (Dec. 18, 2002), https://perma.cc/8TFC-STX5; The Sovereigns: A Dictionary of the Pecu-
liar, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Aug. 1, 2010), https://perma.cc/P9TT-2C8X [hereinafter The
Sovereigns].
24. Sovereign Citizens Movement, supra note 12. R
25. Acknowledging that finding one unified system of Sovereign Citizen beliefs is impossible, I
have drawn from a multitude of sources and websites such as “U.S.A. The Republic,” which contain the
basic—and most often invoked—tenets of the Sovereign Citizen movement.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Defendant’s legal
arguments directly correspond to meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by tax protesters, sovereign
citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-Americans.”); Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 286
(2011); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 769 (7th Cir. 2011) (recounting “campaign of obstreper-
ous interruptions and frivolous legal arguments”); United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir.
1983) (“This appeal is frivolous.”); but see Bey v. State, 847 F.3d 559, 561 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing
4
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time of great cynicism about the institutions of American government,”27
public servants that work in the executive and judicial branches should en-
deavor to inform the public of their actual constitutional rights—misguided
and frivolous as some citizens’ objections may be.
This article seeks to provide civil servants, law enforcement, and the
judiciary with a comprehensive reference guide to the Sovereign Citizen
movement. To do this, the article attempts to make sense of and explain the
most common Sovereign Citizen themes and their failings under the Consti-
tution: first, the jurisdiction of the federal government over actual flesh and
blood citizens; second, the ability to tax citizens and redeeming the
“strawman” (the so-called “Redemption Scheme”); and third, the individ-
ual’s right to travel.28 By explaining the legal shortcomings of the Sover-
eign Citizen ideology, lawyers and judges can address citizens’ concerns
about government overreach, dissuade Sovereign Citizens themselves from
continually reasserting the same meritless arguments, and inform the gen-
eral public of their actual constitutional rights.
II. DISCUSSION
First and foremost, Sovereign Citizens believe that the United States
Government has no inherent power over individual citizens of the various
states without individual consent.29 This concept, which I will call the “Nat-
ural Persons” theory, is the most commonly espoused principle that Sover-
eign Citizens rely on to make their legal claims. The Redemption Scheme
and the unfettered right to travel are extensions of the Natural Persons the-
ory, in that (1) they seek to reclaim their “strawman’s” hidden trust ac-
counts established by the government and (2) they believe that only a cor-
porate artificial person can consent to regulation under state or federal driv-
ing laws. Despite these seemingly earnest interpretations of the law,
however, the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence provide
no support for the Natural Persons theory, Redemption Scheme, or an unfet-
the Moorish and Sovereign Citizen movement with an aim “to introduce readers who may not be famil-
iar with the ‘sovereign citizen’ movement to its principal institutional establishment”).
27. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the Academic Com-
mentator, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 943, 944 (1999).
28. I acknowledge that for lawyers and lay persons alike, the Sovereign Citizens’ arguments
presented here can be baffling. They often defy basic legal tenets and logic. I endeavor to explain each
argument as coherently—and faithfully—as possible, providing direct language from Sovereign Citizen
sources in the footnotes.
29. While the reason for this fear has yet to be examined, it is likely the result of feelings of
economic instability. See Stephen Garrett Smith, An Analysis of the Sovereign Citizen Movement:
Demographics and Trial Behaviors 4–6 (May 2016) (dissertation, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville),
https://perma.cc/H7EC-46FF; Angela P. Harris, Vultures in Eagles’ Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial
Fantasy in Populist Legal Thought, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 270 (2005).
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tered right to travel. Accordingly, I first examine the Sovereign Citizens’
claims, followed by legal refutations of the principles that underlie each
claim.
A. Jurisdiction
1. “Natural” versus “Artificial” persons
In short, Sovereign Citizens believe that the “U.S. citizen, is a legal
fiction that has been created by the federal government, via the social secur-
ity application, and is a corporate employee of the United States by virtue
of being a U.S. citizen.”30 This artificial person alone “is subject to the
jurisdiction of the federal government and of the state government and sub-
ject to the corporate income tax.”31 Accordingly, only by consenting to a
Fourteenth Amendment-based federal citizenship is an individual governed
by the United States Government.32 Additionally, if an individual “re-
nounces” his or her federal citizenship and divests the “legally fictitious
person” through a series of complex steps, then the government has no
power over the “Natural Person.”33 Due in part to the identification of a
“legally fictitious person” as distinct from a “natural person,” Sovereign
Citizens place special emphasis on the use of nouns, capitalization, and sur-
names to support and articulate their theory.34 For example, when filing
motions or pleadings, Sovereign Citizens may refer to themselves as “I, a
Man, of the Family [defendant’s surname], representing the Artificial Per-
sonhood of [defendant’s name in full capital letters].”35
The basis for the Natural Persons theory stems from the belief that
“every individual born in one of the 50 sovereign states was born an indi-
vidual American sovereign, with inalienable rights.”36 Specifically, the
“pursuit of happiness” (as defined by Sovereign Citizens) includes “the
right to engage in a common occupation or business without a license, to
travel freely from one place to another without permission from the state
30. The TRUTH About the 14th Amendment or Who Are You, Really?, U.S.A. THE REPUBLIC (Mar.
4, 2012), https://perma.cc/6DKL-Y54S [hereinafter The TRUTH 1].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Sovereigns, supra note 23. R
34. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge of Bogus ‘Postal Court’ Files Judgments, Claims Only Nouns
Have Legal Meaning, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/5XRH-NW42; Joshua P. Weir,
Sovereign Citizens: A Reasoned Response to the Madness, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 829, 867 (2015)
(citing James Erickson Evans, The “Flesh and Blood” Defense, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1361, 1363
(2012)); The Sovereigns, supra note 23. R
35. See Pho Chang, Why Your Legal Name is Written in All Capital Letters, OMNITHOUGHT.ORG
(May 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/2YQG-2FRL.
36. Tom Morton, Sovereign Citizens Renounce First Sentence of 14th Amendment, CASPER STAR-
TRIBUNE (Apr. 17, 2011), https://perma.cc/BV8G-HE8Z; The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
6
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(driver’s license), the inalienable right to acquire and possess property with-
out paying property tax, etc.”37
Citing Chisholm v. Georgia,38 an antebellum precedent, Sovereign Cit-
izens claim that because the federal government “may acquire property dis-
tinct from that of its members [and] may incur debts,” the Government is an
artificial person.39 A Sovereign Citizen, however, is a free man made of
flesh and blood, and can only be subject to laws that the natural person has
consented to abide by.40 Accordingly, “you,” as a person “waive your sov-
ereign status, to become a subject . . . [b]y contracting with the government
and accepting benefits.”41 The natural person that has consented is “known
as [an] American Citizen, with a capital ‘C’.”42
Sovereign Citizens find additional support for the Natural Persons the-
ory from the Reconstruction era amendments to the Constitution. Sovereign
Citizens believe that the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery,
caused problems for the federal government because up until that point,
“slaves were not citizens of any state or country, because they were just
property, and property did not have citizenship.”43 To rectify this problem,
according to Sovereign Citizens, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified so
as to create “a new class of citizenship.”44 This new citizenship was a “priv-
ilege” granted by the federal government, unsupported by the “sovereign
inalienable right.”45 This new class of citizen, which included former
slaves, is believed to have been made up of “artificial persons” that “con-
tract” with the federal government to gain certain federally-protected
rights.46
In support of this theory, Sovereign Citizens rely on the plain text of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, which states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
37. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
38. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793), overruled by U.S. CONST. amend XI.,
superseded by Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97–98 (1984).
39. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 455). R
40. Id. (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (“The only reason, I believe, why a free man is
bound by human laws, it that he binds himself.”)).
41. Id. (“The only way the government will contract with you, is if you waive your inalienable




45. Id. (noting that “the U.S. citizen is spelled with a lower case ‘c’. This is to show a lower class of
citizenship.”).
46. 14th Amendment Citizen vs Sovereign Constitutional Citizen 2:00–4:30 YOUTUBE (May 8,
2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v[5hr4WlJ-w.
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.47
Breaking the plain language into two sub-sections, Sovereign Citizens
first interpret the phrase “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”48 With regard to the word
“persons,” Sovereign Citizens believe that there are both “natural persons”
(who are the actual physical individuals who have sovereign and inalienable
rights by birth) and “artificial persons” (like the government, or citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment, with only government-created rights).49
Because the collective citizenry created the “artificial person” of the federal
government by giving birth to it, that artificial person (the Government)
cannot purport to assume control over the “natural persons” by amendment
of the Constitution.50
As a result, the “persons” referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment
can only logically be referring to “artificial persons” that are created under
the new class of citizenship. Further “evidence” that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only governs “artificial persons” allegedly exists in the use of “the
United States” and “jurisdiction.” Sovereign Citizens believe that if the
Fourteenth Amendment had intended to govern the “citizens” of the various
states, then the language would have read “the United States of America,”
implying all of the states and not merely the government itself.51 Moreover,
the use of the singular “jurisdiction,” as opposed to “jurisdictions,” also
allegedly shows that the Amendment only considered the singular entity of
the federal government as opposed to all the jurisdictions and entities of the
various states.52
Sovereign Citizens next erroneously interpret the phrase “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States[.]”53 They believe that the privileges
and immunities referred to here are those of the “American Citizen” as a
sovereign individual, whose rights are not granted by the Constitution but
are rather secured by it.54 The real grant is recognized in the Declaration of
Independence, which states that these sovereign individuals “are endowed
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
50. Id.; M.R. Hamilton, Supreme Court Rules Two United States, AFREECOUNTRY.COM (Mar. 29,
2014), https:// perma.cc/8TXW-S2C7.
51. Hamilton, supra note 50. R
52. Id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
54. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
8
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by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.”55 Consequently, a “‘U.S.
citizen’ is a subject of the federal government, [and subject] to its jurisdic-
tion” but “an ‘American Citizen’ is a sovereign individual, and the govern-
ment is subject to him.”56 Because the Government is subject to the “Amer-
ican Citizen,” the Government’s courts (the judicial branch) cannot exercise
jurisdiction over that person without his or her consent.57 Sovereign Citi-
zens believe these core tenets form the building blocks of a legal philoso-
phy that prevents the federal government from exerting control over them.
2. Divesting from the “legal fiction,” oaths, capitalization, and fringe
Having established two types of citizenship, Sovereign Citizens next
seek to divest themselves of their “artificial person”—the being that con-
sented to governance by the federal government. But when did this consent
occur? Many believe that the fact that some birth certificates feature the
birth name in all capital letters58 is proof of “the government’s attempt to
usurp your sovereign status[.]”59 Others assert that the artificial person is
created when a social security number is applied for and issued.60 In deter-
mining whether one has consented and are therefore “contracted” with the
government, Sovereign Citizens are directed to look at their birth certifi-
cates, check books, social security cards, tax returns, driver’s licenses, and
other “legal documents.”61
Once a person determines that a contract has unwittingly been made
with the government, Sovereign Citizens believe they can reclaim their
“sovereign status,” but only by separating oneself “from every benefit of-
fered by the federal government as an inducement to contract.”62 To do so,
55. Id. (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE).
56. Id.
57. Id. (“[N]o court has jurisdiction over him, without his permission.”).
58. Id. (“When an artificial person is named (such as a corporation), proper English grammar says
that the name will be spelled in all capital letters. So if your name is Joseph John Smith, the spelling
indicates that you are a real live flesh and blood natural human (natural person). But if you spell your
name in all capitals, JOSEPH JOHN SMITH, then that indicates that you are an artificial entity (per-
son).”).
59. Id.
60. Id. (“When you applied for Social Security, this artificial person U.S. citizen was created. Un-
knowingly, you contracted to be an artificial corporate person, not realizing that you created a new
government employee.”); Francis X. Sullivan, The Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional Authority: The
Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785, 802 (1999).
61. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
62. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 809. R
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they must first revoke their birth certificate63 by sending various notices and
declarations to different government agencies.64 A Sovereign Citizen also
[c]annot have a valid Social Security Number, a “resident” State driver’s
license, a motor vehicle registered in your name, a bank account in a feder-
ally insured bank, or any other known “contract implied in fact” that would
place you in this “Federal area” and thus within the territorial jurisdiction of
the municipal laws of Congress.65
Simply revoking the contract, however, is insufficient. Sovereign Citi-
zens are often called into court to account for failing to pay taxes, driving
without a license, or other infractions. At this point, Sovereign Citizens be-
lieve they must continue to deny jurisdiction; otherwise they may unwit-
tingly accede to the government’s authority and enter into another con-
tract.66 To avoid this problem, Sovereign Citizens recommend staying out
of courts altogether when charged with a crime or civil infraction. Because
“American Citizen’s have no standing in court,” any Sovereign Citizen will
necessarily be deemed an “artificial person” when they appear for proceed-
ings.67
If one cannot avoid going to court, then Sovereign Citizens believe
that there are other means to challenge the validity of the tribunal. First, a
Sovereign Citizen should refuse to identify him or herself  in court.68 He or
she may also point to the language or capitalization of the court documents,
asserting that the individual identified in those documents is actually one’s
renounced legal fiction or “corporate citizen.”69 Because that entity, as op-
posed to the “Natural Person,” is the subject of the claim, a Sovereign Citi-
zen believes he or she can deny the court’s jurisdiction over the physical
person present. Accordingly, Sovereign Citizens claim that they are making
a “special appearance” only to challenge jurisdiction, or refuse to pass the
bar into the courtroom lest they accidently create “joinder.”70
63. T. Collins, White Paper on State Citizenship, LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA (Oct. 27,
1997), https://perma.cc/JR6S-BFG6 (this process is called “REVOCATION OF SIGNATURE AND
POWER OF ATTORNEY.”).
64. Id. (This process involves sending “[a] notice of intent[; a] declaration of sovereignty[; a]n oath
to your state[; a] notice that you are using Federal Reserve Notes under protest[; and a] revocation of
signature and power of attorney” to the county recorder’s office).
65. Id.
66. Think, by way of analogy, to a defendant acceding to a court’s personal jurisdiction by appear-
ing and participating in the litigation.
67. The TRUTH About Court Rooms! Stay Out!, U.S.A. THE REPUBLIC (Mar. 4, 2012), https://per
ma.cc/H6JB-HMLA [hereinafter The TRUTH 2] (Sovereign Citizens also believe that “only a U.S. citi-
zen [aka the ‘artificial person’] has standing in today’s courts”).
68. The Anti-Government Movement Guidebook, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CT. (1999), https://
perma.cc/ T5NJ-VXFY [hereinafter NCSC Guidebook].
69. Evans, supra note 34, at 1372. R
70. Weir, supra note 34, at 832. R
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON202.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-AUG-19 11:52
2019 LEGAL RESPONSE TO SOVEREIGN CITIZEN MOVEMENT 163
When charged with a crime, Sovereign Citizens may ask for the gov-
ernment to present the aggrieved party.71 For regulatory crimes such as tax
fraud or speeding, there will be no aggrieved party to present. As such, the
Sovereign Citizen will contend that the court has no jurisdiction because
only a natural person can be the victim of crimes and only an artificial
person is subject to statutory law.72 Without an aggrieved party, the natural
person cannot have committed a crime and the case should be dismissed.
Furthermore, the Sovereign Citizen may challenge the judge’s position
in the court by asking about his or her “oath.” One site suggests that one
could “[a]sk the judge if he has taken an oath to uphold and defend the
constitution [because] he has to say yes,” and then the judge is put on notice
that he or she is dealing with a Natural Person with inalienable rights.73 If
the judge refuses to affirm his or her oath (to the individual’s satisfaction),
the Sovereign Citizen can move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because
that refusal secretly means the court is not an Article III court at all.74
Lastly, Sovereign Citizens often challenge the authority or jurisdiction
of a court based on the type of American flag present. This argument is
based on the belief that the Constitution only contemplates three forms of
law: “common law, equity (contract law) and Admiralty law.”75 While Sov-
ereign Citizens believe they are governed under common law (also known
as “God’s Law”), admiralty law is actually the “King’s Law” and subjects
an unwitting party to the federal government’s jurisdiction.76 So why does
the type of flag matter? According to Sovereign Citizens, “[f]ederal territo-
rial law is evidenced by the Executive Branch’s Admiralty flag (a federal
flag with a gold or yellow fringe on it) . . . .”77 This admiralty flag, with its
gold fringe, is evidence that the federal government declared martial law
71. Is There a Right to Travel Without a Driver’s License in the United States?, PSEUDOLAW (Oct.
8, 2017), https://perma.cc/6Z3Y-FX47.
72. M.R. Hamilton, Always Challenge Jurisdiction, AFREECOUNTRY.COM (Apr. 25, 2014), https://
perma.cc/L8NB-LEJF (“A crime is only committed when one of the [Natural Persons] ‘commits’ a
crime against another one of the [Natural Persons]. A crime is not committed when a statute has been
‘violated’ by a [Natural Person], because statutes do not apply to [Natural People], they only apply to
[‘artificial persons’] and other fictitious entities, such as licensed companies.”).
73. Notice of Acceptance of Constitutions and of Oath of Office, Instructions for Use of the Notice
of Acceptance of Constitutions and of Oath of Office, FREEDOM-SCHOOL.COM, https://perma.cc/6HLL-
UR2R [hereinafter Instructions] (“If you ask the judge if he intends to conduct his duties in compliance
with that oath, what can he possibly say but yes? The judge knows if the court is an Article III court, but
he is hoping you will not understand this or how to force him to comply with his oath of office.”); see
also OR Judge Refuses Constitutional Oath—Arrests Challenging Citizens, RENSE.COM (Feb. 21, 2002),
https://perma.cc/XN5Y-T2ZS.
74. Instructions, supra note 73. R
75. Treason in Government! Admiralty on Land! Where’s the Water?, BAREFOOTSWORLD.ORG (Apr.
27, 1997), https://perma.cc/9STV-C7K3 [hereinafter Treason].
76. Treason, supra note 73 (“When you walk into a court and see this flag you are put on notice R
that you are in a Admiralty Court and that the king is in control.”).
77. Collins, supra note 63. R
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and sought to establish courts with complete control.78 Accordingly, Sover-
eign Citizens argue that “any action taken under the yellow-fringed ‘Ameri-
can flag of war’ is a deprivation of due process” and that the court has
unlawfully taken away your constitutional or inalienable sovereign rights.79
By denying these rights and subjecting a natural person to an improperly
formed military tribunal, Sovereign Citizens believe the court has no real
jurisdiction over them.
B. The Redemption Scheme
Closely related to the Natural Persons theory is the Redemption
Scheme, which expands upon the notion of a government-created
“strawman” that can be used to satisfy debts and avoid paying federal in-
come taxes.80 Sovereign Citizens believe that when the U.S. Government
went off the gold standard in 1933, it pledged the future earnings of its
citizens to support the value of its currency.81 By subsequently removing
oneself as surety for the strawman (otherwise referred to as an “artificial
person”), the Sovereign Citizen believes an individual can control the
strawman and access the “Treasury Direct Account” that holds all the bor-
rowed collateral.82
1. The fall of the Gold Standard and the rise of the Redemption Scheme
According to Sovereign Citizens, the beginning of the financial ruin of
the United States Government began in 1913 when Congress passed the
Federal Reserve Act.83 That Act created and established the Federal Re-
serve System, which created a central bank that could, among other things,
issue Federal Reserve Notes (U.S. dollars).84 Sovereign Citizens believe
that in 1933,
[t]he International Bankers served Notice of [debt and insolvency] on the
government. Between January and July of 1933 the Roosevelt Administra-
tion and Congress responded. Exactly how all this was orchestrated is too
78. The TRUTH 2, supra note 67; see also Treason, supra note 73 (citing “Pursuant to U.S.C. R
Chapter 1, 2, and 3; Executive Order No. 10834, August 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865, a military flag is a flag
that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a YELLOW FRINGE, bordered on
three sides. The President of the United states designates this deviation from the regular flag, by execu-
tive order, and in his capacity as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Armed forces.”).
79. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 805. R
80. See M.R. Hamilton, Are You required to Pay a Tax on Your Income?, AFREECOUNTRY.COM
(Mar. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/Y3TA-6UHN.
81. The Sovereigns, supra note 23. R
82. Meeting Your Strawman, LEGALUCC.COM, https://perma.cc/3W34-7TW9.
83. J.M. Berger, Without Prejudice: What Sovereign Citizens Believe, George Washington Univ.
Program on Extremism (June 2016), https://perma.cc/9RXF-9UFX; see also Meads, 2012 ABQB at 530.
84. Berger, supra note 83. R
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lengthy to be addressed here, but this fact is clear –since then the birth or
naturalization record for every U.S. Citizen is on file in the official records
in Washington, D.C. and the property and assets of every living U.S. Citizen
is pledged as collateral for the National Debt.85
The Federal Reserve, a “private corporation,” then began issuing private
commercial debt instruments known as “Federal Reserve Notes.”86 In order
to meet the demand for ever growing federal spending, the government as-
signed all U.S. born citizens—present and future—as collateral.87
The government achieved, and allegedly continues to achieve, this
goal by registering all newborn babies, through their “Certificate of Live
Birth” and social security numbers, in Washington, D.C.88 A “bond” is then
taken out by the Department of the Treasury and held in a “Treasury Direct
Account.”89 Some Sovereign Citizens believe that account contains any-
where from $650,000,90 to $1,000,000,91 to $20,000,000,92 per person.
While the pre-divested or pre-redeemed person acts as a beneficiary
and surety for the bond, the “redeemed” person can make use of it by con-
trolling the strawman. Prior to making use of this bond, one must generally
complete the divesting process previously described.93 Otherwise, an indi-
vidual would be forced to work off the U.S. Government’s debt as a surety
to one’s artificial person and a wage-slave, because “any time you use [Fed-
eral Reserve Notes], you are dealing with the property of a corporation, a
legal fiction in law. And a fiction can only deal with another artificial per-
son.”94
2. Tactics used to free money from the “Strawman” or “When in
commerce do as commerce does, use the Uniform Commercial Code”
Through “redemption,” a process that looks similar to divestment from
an artificial person, the Sovereign Citizen can separate himself from the
fictitious strawman and make use of the funds that are located in the Trea-
85. Barton A. Buhtz, An Investigative Report, FAMGUARDIAN.ORG (May 26, 2003), http://famguar-
dian.org/ subjects/MoneyBanking/UCC/InvestigativeReportUCC.pdf; The TRUTH About the United
States Government Bankruptcy! and National Emergencies!, U.S.A. THE REPUBLIC (Mar, 4, 2012),
https://perma.cc/G4QV-P8T6 [hereinafter The TRUTH 3].
86. The TRUTH 3, supra note 85. R
87. Id.
88. Buhtz, supra note 85 (Evidence of this scheme is purportedly displayed on “the Certificate of R
Live Birth,” where “a bond # is stamped on the back”).
89. Sovereign Citizen Movement: Extremists Claim to be “Beyond the Law”, supra note 22. R
90. Buhtz, supra note 85. R
91. Meeting Your Strawman, supra note 82. R
92. The Sovereigns, supra note 23. R
93. See Mallek, supra note 13. R
94. The TRUTH 3, supra note 85. R
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sury Direct Account.95 The redeemed Sovereign Citizen will also then be
“the controller and creditor with the highest lien hold interest in the straw
man.”96 As for the process, it begins with the UCC, which Sovereign Citi-
zens believe “is legislated (Administrative Law) that codifies the rules for
all commercial transactions between countries, states and individuals.”97
Because “the courts acknowledge they do not have the authority or jurisdic-
tion to amend, alter or nullify any of the Articles of the UCC,” invocation
of the Code is believed to be unassailable.98
First, the Sovereign Citizen must submit a copy of UCC Financing
Statement (“UCC-1”), in hard copy, with an original signature, presented
via certified or registered mail, to both the state and the Secretary of the
Treasury.99 Once filed, it becomes “a legal document of public record iden-
tifying the filer as the Secured Party[,]” presumably to the strawman. There-
after, Sovereign Citizens believe that “no court can lawfully rule on the fact
or existence of the filing itself [because that] filing is a legal fact[,]” and
“there is a secured, vested interest therein holding a superior claim and all
other parties at interest who file thereafter must acknowledge, accept and
respect the Secured Party’s superior and prior position.”100 Adjustments to
the original document can be made by filing an amendment under UCC-3,
which permits amendments to a UCC-1 Financing Statement.101
Alternatively, some Sovereign Citizens believe that one “must send a
nonnegotiable (private) ‘Charge Back’ & a nonnegotiable ‘Bill of Ex-
change’ to the United States Secretary of Treasury, along with a copy of
[your] birth certificate, the evidence, the [Manufacturer’s Certificate of Ori-
gin] of the straw man.”102 By doing this, one discharges his or her “portion
of the public debt, releasing the real man, from the debts, liabilities & obli-
gations of the straw man,”103 which grants that person access to the funds as
the Secured Party.
Once these documents are filed, one can also use “Bills of Exchange”
or other documents to redeem funds or pay for goods. A bill of exchange
purportedly accesses the Treasury Direct Account, which they believe
contains the balance of the strawman’s bond under 26 U.S.C.
95. Sovereign Citizen Movement: Extremists Claim to be “Beyond the Law”, supra note 22; The R
Sovereigns, supra note 23. R
96. Meeting Your Strawman, supra note 82 (“[The redeemed person] does not own the straw man R
but he controls the straw man by the primary lien hold interest.”).
97. Buhtz, supra note 85. R
98. Id.
99. Id. (UCC-1 “details a Secured Party’s status in any commercial transaction according to the
Articles of the UCC as well as various section[s] of the United States Code dealing with ‘Property’”).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Meeting Your Strawman, supra note 82. R
103. Id.
14
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§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).104 All a Sovereign Citizen needs to do is write a Bill of
Exchange for the exact amount owed and send it to the creditor and the
Treasury Department; in theory, the Treasury Department will pay the
amount out of the Treasury Direct Account.105 Alternatively, it can be re-
ferred to as a “Charge Back Notice,” which should be sent to both the credi-
tor and the Treasury Department.106 When a claim for back taxes “is made
by the IRS, a federal or state taxing agency,” a Sovereign Citizen need only
stamp “Accepted For Value” and mail it “to the Secretary of the Treasury
for discharge.”107 Sovereign Citizens believe the authority for this action is
documented in House Joint Resolution 192 and the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood.108 By and through this process,
Sovereign Citizens believe they have unlocked the key to reclaim their
wealth from the government.109
C. A Sovereign Citizen’s constitutional “right to travel”
The most common type of Sovereign Citizen claim encountered by
local and state police, as well as federal border patrol agents, is the “right to
travel.”110 Citing the Constitution,111 Supreme Court cases, and a plethora
of other sources, Sovereign Citizens believe they are not required to have
driver’s licenses, license plates, vehicle registration, or to stop at border or
sobriety checkpoints.112 Similar to other claims, Sovereign Citizens discuss-
ing the “right to travel” place special emphasis on the words being used.
They differentiate between a driver and a traveler; an automobile and a
motor vehicle; commercial and non-commercial; and public versus private
104. Id.
105. Buhtz, supra note 85. R
106. Sovereign Citizen Movement: Extremists Claim to be “Beyond the Law”, supra note 22. R
107. Buhtz, supra note 85. R
108. 307 U.S. 247 (1939); Buhtz, supra note 85. R
109. Although the core Redemption concepts have remained consistent, there are numerous varia-
tions on the basic scheme created by new “gurus” regularly. See Gold Shield Alliance, Freedom in
Action GOLDSHIELDALLIANCE, https://perma.cc/9R2N-UTMT; Cyber Museum of Scams & Frauds,
QUATLOOS, available at http://www.quatloos.com/Q-Forum/viewtopic.php?f=49&t=11506 (last visited
Mar. 2, 2019); Fogbow Falsehoods Unchallenged Only Fester and Grow, THE FOG BOW, https://perma
.cc/XW6H-9F9C.
110. See, e.g., Not Personal, Sovereign Citizen ‘Right To Travel’ Fails in Challenge to Court’s Juris-
diction, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2017), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqH1rHDSBO8
(last visited Mar. 2, 2019). Sovereign Citizens often video record their interactions with police and
courts, especially when challenging driving laws.
111. Although the “freedom to travel” is most often invoked in state courts, the federal Constitution
is the document most often relied upon. State law, however, may also provide ample refutation of many
state-related sovereign citizen claims. Pamela B. Loginsky, Freemen: Armageddon’s Prophets of Hate
and Terror, A WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS (Jan. 25, 1999), https://perma
.cc/QZ7S-VEQL.
112. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 799. R
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conveyances.113 Once a Sovereign Citizen claims that he or she is merely a
traveler or traveling, he or she then uses federal and state cases to support
the “right to travel.” Sovereign Citizens also believe the right to travel con-
stitutes a complete bar on government interference with travel in the ab-
sence of probable cause or evidence that a victim has been harmed.114
1. Specific language and use of words
First, Sovereign Citizens claim that “‘to drive’ is to go on the roads by
a motorized conveyance doing business or being engaged in commerce, and
it is a privilege. ‘To travel,’ on the other hand, is a right, and no legislation
can be passed to strip you of your fundamental, inherent rights.”115 Why
does this matter? Because “[t]o state you are ‘driving’ is to unwittingly
place yourself in admiralty or commercial jurisdiction[, and as] a sovereign
being, you never need surrender your rights and exchange them for privi-
leges.”116
Where these allegedly binding definitions come from is a varied and
often perplexing matter. Looking to the terms “travel” and “traveler,” Sov-
ereign Citizens believe they “refer[ ] to one who uses a conveyance to go
from one place to another, and include[s] all those who use the highways as
a matter of Right” because “the phrase ‘for hire’ never occurs.”117 Con-
versely, the term “driver” is defined as “[o]ne employed in conducting a
coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle[,]” and therefore “[it] should be
self-evident that this individual could not be ‘traveling’ on a journey, but is
using the road as a place of business.”118
Likewise, the terms “automobile” and “motor vehicle” denote special
meaning. “The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for
the transportation of persons on highways,” and “is private property in use
for private purposes.”119 Whereas “motor vehicle” is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 31 as “every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or
drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the high-
ways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or prop-
erty or cargo.” Looking to these definitions, Sovereign Citizens deduce that
113. Id.
114. Id. at 799–00.
115. Makia Freeman, How to Drive Without a License, THE FREEDOM ARTICLES (Aug. 7, 2013),
https://perma.cc/RZA6-UHKA.
116. Id.
117. How You Lost It! Driver Licensing vs. the Right to Travel, U.S.A THE REPUBLIC, https://perma
.cc/4829-PF4A (last visited May 11, 2018) [hereinafter How You Lost It!] (citing 25 AM. JUR. 1ST
Highways § 427 (1936); Lockett v. State, 47 Ala. 42 (1872)); Traveler, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed., 1914); Travel, CENTURY DICTIONARY (1st ed., 1889)).
118. Id. (citing Driver, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914)).
119. Id. (quoting American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120 (N.H. 1948).
16
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“[c]learly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes,
while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways
for trade, commerce, or hire.”120 Moreover, “one who uses the road in the
ordinary course of life and business for the purpose of travel and transporta-
tion is a traveler.”121
As a non-commercial traveler using a private conveyance such as an
automobile, Sovereign Citizens believe that one should not be required to
obtain a license. Pointing to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “li-
cense” as “[t]he permission by competent authority to do an act which,
without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, a tort, or otherwise
not allowable,”122 a Sovereign Citizen refutes the idea of needing a license
to drive. “A license is permission from the government to do something,
that, without the license, would be illegal,” and traveling is not illegal.123
Under this rationale, one cannot be required to have a license to travel be-
cause traveling is a constitutional right.
2. The “right” to travel
Beginning with this “correct” terminology, Sovereign Citizens point to
a surplus of Supreme Court and state court precedents that recognize a
“right to travel.” The four most common cases and quotes, reproduced
across most Sovereign Citizen forums, are:124
(1) “The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is
not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the
public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.” Chicago Motor
Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.125
(2) “The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to trans-
port his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a
mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a com-
mon law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness.” Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.126
120. Id. (quoting American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120 (N.H. 1948).
121. Id.
122. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed., 1990).
123. The TRUTH About Inalienable Rights!, U.S.A. THE REPUBLIC, https://perma.cc/3JKN-LPV6
(last visited May 11, 2018) [hereinafter The TRUTH 4].
124. In what could be considered psuedolaw irony, these commonly reproduced passages are not
accurate to the actual caselaw. See, e.g., Jack McLamb, Despite Actions of Police and Local Courts,
Higher Courts Have Ruled That American Citizens Have a Right to Travel Without State Permits, LAW-
FUL PATH (last modified 2014), https://perma.cc/2TRY-35SL; The TRUTH 4, supra note 123; Sovereign R
Right to Operate a Private Vehicle, THECOUNTRYGUARD.ORG, https://perma.cc/US53-MPD3 [hereinafter
Sovereign Right to Operate].
125. 169 N.E. 22, 28 (Ill. 1929).
126. 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930).
17
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(3) “The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.” Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125.127
(4) “The right to travel is a well-established common right that does not
owe its existence to the federal government. It is recognized by the
courts as a natural right.” Schactman v. Dulles, 96 App DC 287, 225
F2d 938, at 941.128
Looking at these cases, Sovereign Citizens believe “[i]t could not be stated
more directly or conclusively that citizens of the states have a common law
right to travel, without approval or restriction (license), and that this right is
protected under the U.S Constitution.”129 Furthermore, as a right that is
“fundamental to our existence,” Sovereign Citizens believe that the right to
travel can never be abrogated or regulated in any way.130
3. The “right” not to be stopped
At traffic stops and DUI or border patrol checkpoints, Sovereign Citi-
zens will often contest the legality of the state action and recite questions
such as “Am I free to go?” or “What is your articulable reason for stopping
me?” to any and all questions by the police.131 They may refuse to speak
whatsoever, simply pressing a piece of paper against the vehicle’s win-
dow.132 This resistance is generally based on one of three notions. First, the
“Government—in requiring the people to obtain drivers licenses, and ac-
cepting vehicle inspections and DUI/DWI roadblocks without question—is
restricting, and therefore violating, the people’s common law right to
travel.”133 Second, the police may not stop a vehicle or detain an individual
absent being able to articulate a reasonable suspicion of a crime being com-
mitted.134 Third, the government cannot tax individuals for exercising their
127. 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
128. 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. 1955).
129. McLamb, supra note 124 R
130. Freeman, supra note 115 (“Our right to travel can never be stripped from us; it is as fundamen- R
tal to our existence as our right to breathe.”).
131. See The Freedom Paradox, Crushing A DUI Checkpoint, YOUTUBE (Aug. 25, 2015), available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?=64&v=7nDiBC28GYs (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Thomas Sauer,
Border Patrol Corruption, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?=33
2&v=yhtDTOHigcg (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
132. Notice to Checkpoint Agents, FREEDOMSCHOOL.COM, https://perma.cc/ESK7-QF39 [hereinafter
Notice to Checkpoint Agents].
133. McLamb, supra note 124. R
134. Notice to Checkpoint Agents, supra note 132 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. R
543 (1976)).
18
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constitutional rights,135 and speed limits or checkpoints are “simply an un-
lawful tax or impost on travel” under Crandall v. Nevada.136
III. A LEGAL RESPONSE
Most of the Sovereign Citizens’ claims and jurisdictional challenges—
from capitalization to oaths—depend on the Natural Persons theory.137 In-
deed, if the Fourteenth Amendment did not create an “Artificial Person” or
an unwitting “contract” with the federal government, then these individuals
would be subject to the federal government’s jurisdiction. The Redemption
Scheme also relies on this distinction in that the Government has allegedly
borrowed against and holds money on behalf of a Natural Person’s artificial
“strawman.”138 Furthermore, by seeking to enforce traffic laws, the Sover-
eign Citizen believes the Government is executing its contractual rights
against the corporate entity of the artificial person.139 In rebutting these
claims, it is first necessary to establish where a person’s constitutional
rights are found, who decides what statutes and the Constitution means, and
what documents or sources have binding legal effect. While some of the
following is fairly academic for trained lawyers, Sovereign Citizens lack the
foundational precepts of the American legal system and Constitution. To
rebut the movement’s substantive constitutional claims, lawyers will need
to explain the fundamentals to Sovereign Citizens before we can reverse the
movement’s growth.
A. Dude, where are my rights?
Sovereign Citizens often cite the U.S. Constitution, the UCC, the
Magna Carta,140 the Articles of Confederation,141 and numerous other
quasi-legal document to support their assertions. Although authoritative
sounding, the true basis for a citizen’s constitutional rights is found in the
Constitution itself. The U.S. Supreme Court is the only legal body that can
interpret and give legal effect to the Constitution. Accordingly, Sovereign
135. How You Lost It!, supra note 117 (“The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is R
given the power to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution wrote that document
in vain.”).
136. Sovereign Right to Operate, supra note 124 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868)). R
137. See supra Part II(A).
138. See supra Part II(B).
139. See supra Part II(C).
140. See Kennedy v. Law Sch. Admissions Council, Inc., No. CV 18-1316-RGA, 2018 WL
6188781, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 27, 2018); see also Kevin Underhill, Rejected Applicant Sues Law Schools
for Violating Magna Carta, LOWERING THE BAR (Sept. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/NXH6-NZLX.
141. People or Citizen, Which One Are You?, 1215.ORG, https://perma.cc/KTU2-8YEM.
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Citizens’ citations to—and reliance on—dictionaries, state court opinions,
specific capitalization, or state records are misplaced and unavailing.
1. The U.S. Constitution and constitutional rights
On July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress adopted the United
States Declaration of Independence. As stated by the Declaration’s pream-
ble, all men “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”142 “[T]o
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, [and they]
deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed[.]”143 These
aspirational statements do not provide substantive rights nor do they have
“have the force of organic law.”144 In the Declaration’s final section, how-
ever, it proclaimed that the United States owed no allegiance or loyalty to
the British crown and were no longer subject to its laws.145 This section
alone, arguably, is the only statement in the Declaration that does more than
provide a statement of facts or grievances; it provides the justification for
the American Revolution. Effectively, other than establishing that the
United States “of Right ought to be Free and Independent States,” the Dec-
laration has no binding or legal force.146
The Articles of Confederation, which first established a federal gov-
ernment in 1781, likely lost their binding force with the ratification required
under Article VII of the proposed Constitution.147 Under Article VI, Clause
2, of the Constitution, also known as the “Supremacy Clause,” only the
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]”148
Accordingly, members of the federal government who swear oaths to the
142. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (1776).
143. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (1776).
144. Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901) (stating “[w]hile such declaration of principles may
not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and
duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the
latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe
to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence” (quoting Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886))).
145. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (1776).
146. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Declaration of Inde-
pendence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts.”).
147. Scott v. Jones, 46 U.S. 343, 360 (1847) (“[I]t pleased the whole people of the United States to
abolish their government, and to abrogate the old articles of confederation. A new constitution was
adopted, an entirely new form of government was established, which took the place of the old one.”);
Vasan Kesavan, When Did the Articles of Confederation Cease to Be Law, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35,
49–50 (2002).
148. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Constitution, as well as “the Judges in every State,” are bound by this “su-
preme Law.”149 In sum, the Constitution—and statutes or treaties lawfully
made under the Constitution—are the binding law that citizens are pro-
tected by and must follow.
2. Interpreting the Constitution and case law
In rebutting Sovereign Citizen arguments, however, it is necessary to
establish what is and what is not binding law under the Constitution—as
well as who has the power to decide those questions. Academic or elemen-
tary as it may be to lawyers, Sovereign Citizens routinely use as “evidence”
non-constitutional and non-binding authorities. Under Article III, Section 2,
the power of the federal judiciary is “extend[ed] to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority[.]”150 In Mar-
bury v. Madison,151 the Supreme Court established its role in reviewing the
laws and the Constitution:
[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the consti-
tution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably
to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case.152
This judicial power of constitutional and federal statutory review,
which is “vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”153 has also necessa-
rily been extended to review state civil154 and criminal155 cases that impli-
cate the Constitution or federal law. The authority of the judiciary, stem-
ming from Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, applies:
[t]o all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—
to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or
more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Cit-
izens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”156
149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
150. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2.
151. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
152. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (emphasis added).
153. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
154. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
155. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
156. U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2.
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Notably, the power extends to all cases and controversies enumerated
including admiralty claims, belying a commonly held Sovereign Citizen be-
lief that the federal courts sit in admiralty only.157 Additionally, the distinc-
tion between “common law, equity (contract law) and Admiralty law” is not
jurisdictional, but rather affects the form of relief provided by the courts.
And as Article III, Section 2, makes clear, “[t]he judicial power shall extend
to all cases, in law and equity.”158 In short, the United States Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation and application to
state and federal laws, in every case.
More specifically, the only portion of a Supreme Court opinion that is
legally binding is the judicial holding—i.e., those parts of a court’s opinion
that were necessary for the decision. The Supreme Court—and common
law rules of interpretation—mandate that words and phrases should be ana-
lyzed and applied in light of their context, not in isolation.159 In Hynes v.
Grimes Packing Company,160 the Court admonished a party that attempted
to narrowly define a statutory term by cherry-picking favorable language.
Similarly, pulling distinct phrases from judicial opinions161 or contracts,162
without consideration of the context, can be misleading. This is especially
true for individuals persuaded by Sovereign Citizens’ oft-quoted language,
which is effectively given “a talismanic significance.”163
3. Fringe on the flag
Relatedly, the flag in a courtroom does not “signal” that a court is
sitting in admiralty jurisdiction or somehow limit a court’s authority over a
defendant. 4 U.S.C § 1 states that “[t]he flag of the United States shall be
thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag
shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field.”164 In 1925, Attorney Gen-
157. Not Personal, Sovereign Citizen Freeman in Court Utterly Fails with Judge – Default Issued,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2016), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBK-DMDlzM4&feature=
youtu.be (last visited Mar. 2, 2019).
158. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Merge Equity and Common
Law, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, https://perma.cc/EM9F-X2GR (discussing the FRCP’s merger of equity
and common law).
159. United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542–43 (1940).
160. 337 U.S. 86, 115–16 (1949) (“[O]ne may not fully comprehend the statute’s scope by ex-
tracting from it a single phrase, such as ‘public lands’ and getting the phrase’s meaning from the diction-
ary or even from dissimilar statutes.”).
161. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001) (“[T]his Court is bound by holdings, not
language.”).
162. Macdonald v. Winfield Corp., 191 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1951) (“[N]o principle of contract law
requires or even permits us to take the word out of context.”).
163. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1988),
abrogated on other grounds by Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
164. The Flag of the United States, Exec. Order No. 10834, 24 Fed. Reg. 6865 (1959–1953) (provid-
ing that the flag shall have 50 stars).
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eral John G. Sargent addressed the use of fringe on the flag pursuant to
Army Regulations, No. 260–10.165 In finding that the “matter is one of
those over which Congress may exercise control if it will,”166 the absence
of a statute meant “that the question of a fringe may be determined by the
President as Commander in Chief.”167 The last executive order on the mat-
ter, Executive Order No. 10834, “signed by President Eisenhower, himself
a military man, did not address this issue.”168 Ultimately, no relief can be
afforded based on fringe around the flag as “fringe is not considered to be a
part of the flag, and it is without heraldic significance.”169
4. Capitalization, dictionaries, and special words
Despite the importance attributed by Sovereign Citizens to the specific
capitalization of words or names, these arguments are also without merit.170
Although the capitalization used in the Declaration of Independence and
Constitution appear unique to present-day readers, the drafters used a then-
common stylistic choice to capitalize nouns, likely owed to Germanic lan-
guage heritage.171 Additionally, “[c]aptioning court documents with all cap-
ital letters complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)”172 and “[t]he use of all
capital letters in the caption of court documents is a typographical conven-
tion without legal significance.”173 Ultimately, capitalization is irrelevant to
establishing substantive rights or proving some hidden meaning in an in-
dictment or legal pleading.
Sovereign Citizens also make the mistake of relying on excerpts of
cases, dictionary definitions, and isolated statutes to “prove” their claims.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court alone has the power to defini-
tively interpret and define the terms that appear in the Constitution or fed-
eral statutes. For that reason, Sovereign Citizens’ reliance on state court
165. Nat’l Flag of U.S., 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 483, 485 (1925).
166. Id. at 487.
167. Id. at 486.
168. McCann v. Greenway, 952 F. Supp. 647, 650–51 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Exec. Order No.
10834, 24 Fed. Reg. 6865 (1959–1953)).
169. Nat’l Flag of U.S., supra note 165, at 485. R
170. One example is the “Republic for the united States of America,” a Sovereign Citizen alternative
government that claimed it was the real United States government based on the lower-case U in “united
States” used in the Declaration of Independence. See Self-Proclaimed President of Sovereign Citizen
Group Sentenced to Federal Prison for Promoting Tax Fraud Scheme, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION (July 31, 2013), https://perma.cc/DTV6-8E8B.
171. Judith Thurman, In Defense of Cursive, NEW YORKER (July 5, 2012), https://perma.cc/4PKZ-
38FH.
172. Adams v. City of Marshall, No. 4:05-CV-62, 2005 WL 2739029, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24,
2005).
173. City of Marshall, 2005 WL 2739029, at *1 (quoting United States v. Heijnen, 375 F. Supp. 2d
1229, 1231 (D. N.M., 2005)).
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opinions to support their various constitutional claims is fundamentally
flawed. Nor may individuals rely on dictionary definitions to determine the
precise meaning of words that appear in the Constitution. Even though ven-
erated publications such as Black’s Law Dictionary may be helpful or illu-
minating,174 they are not binding legal authority and cannot be relied upon
to establish one’s rights.175
5. Birth certificates, social security numbers, and the Uniform
Commercial Code
Lastly, social security numbers, birth certificates, and invocations of
the UCC do not constitute a contract with the government, nor do they
represent tacit government acknowledgment of some artificial person. So-
cial security numbers and birth certificates are merely records designed to
track births and citizens, and the UCC is inapplicable to the federal govern-
ment and without legal authority unless codified by a state:
Birth certificates are legal documents issued by the state in which a birth
occurs, and social security numbers are a form of identification issued by
the Social Security Administration, an agency of the federal government.
Neither birth certificates nor social security numbers recognize or impose
contractual rights, obligations, or duties.176
Additionally, birth certificates are non-transferable items and do not
qualify as commercial paper under the oft-cited UCC § 3–104, nor may a
person “legally profit from the sale of birth certificates [as] such documents
hold no commercial value.”177 Pointedly, 42 U.S.C. § 405 grants the Com-
missioner of Social Security the statutory authority to issue social security
numbers, requiring “applicants for social security account numbers” to pro-
vide the Commissioner with evidence of “age, citizenship, or alien status,
and true identity[.]”178 If social security numbers were actually a grant or
recognition of an artificial citizenship conferred by the government, there
would be no requirement to provide evidence of any additional facts.
The UCC, which Sovereign Citizens rely on to establish substantive
rights and to divest themselves of their “artificial” U.S. citizenship, deals
primarily with transactions involving personal property (movable property),
and not real property (immovable property). The UCC is not itself law.179
174. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
175. Alabama Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135, 1150 n.12 (11th Cir.
2014); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (11th Cir. 1991).
176. Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 286 (2011).
177. Palmer v. Everson, No. C-2-08-466, 2008 WL 5109195, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2008).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2018).
179. Gilbert v. Monaco Coach Corp., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (“The UCC,
itself, is not the law of any state, nor is it federal law.”); Calo-Rivera v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico,
No. 05-1832 CCC, 2006 WL 1514377, at *5 (D.P.R. May 31, 2006) (quoting U.C.C. Preface (2005)
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Instead, it is proposed law—created as a joint project of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute (both private organizations)—that can be adopted by states.180
Once enacted, the UCC is codified into a state’s code of statutes. “[T]he
U.S. Government, as the sovereign, is not bound by such State statutes as
the UCC.”181 And although unrelated to the Redemption Scheme generally,
the UCC also cannot provide a basis for challenges to federal incarcera-
tion.182
B. Citizenship and jurisdiction
I turn now to the Sovereign Citizens claims regarding citizenship and
jurisdiction. The Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other federal statutes, provide the
government with jurisdiction to prosecute citizens and non-citizens living in
the United States.
1. Citizenship Clause
Section 1, clause 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment, the “Citizenship
Clause,” states that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside.” In United States v. Wong Kim Ark,183 the
Supreme Court examined this clause and its implications for children born
in the United States to foreign parents.184 The Court noted that “it is beyond
doubt that, before . . . the adoption of the [Fourteenth Amendment], all
white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States . . .
were native-born citizens of the United States.”185
The Citizenship Clause’s “main purpose doubtless was . . . to put it
beyond doubt that all blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within
the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States.”186
“The phrase ‘subject to its jurisdiction,’” the Court concluded, “was in-
(“The Code is not federal law. It is a ‘comprehensive modernizations of various statutes relating to
commercial transactions . . .’ prepared under the joint sponsorship of the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioner on Uniform State Laws . . .”)).
180. For example, Louisiana has only adopted parts of the UCC. R.R. Kyle Ardoin, What is Uniform
Commercial Code?, LOUISIANA SECURITY OF STATE, https://perma.cc/642Z-C47S.
181. Whitesell v. Comm’r, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1406 (2017) (citing Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103,
110 (1932)).
182. Carter v. Wands, 431 F. App’x 628, 629 (10th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (“Nor does the UCC provide a
basis to challenge the conditions of his imprisonment”).
183. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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tended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citi-
zens or subjects of foreign states, born within the United States.”187 The
Court also addressed any “distinction between citizenship of the United
States and citizenship of a state,” stating that “it is only necessary that he
should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the
Union” but state citizenship requires federal citizenship and residence.188 In
other words, while a person’s state citizenship is dependent on residency,
“every citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen of the United States.”189
But what is a citizen of the United States? Is it a fictional corporate
entity as believed by Sovereign Citizens? The answer is clear: a citizen for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is the actual,
physical person born or naturalized in the United States.190 First, it would
be inapposite to include the phrase “born or naturalized” in the Citizenship
Clause if the amendment was merely meant to establish the creation of arti-
ficial or corporate citizens. Corporations are formed, not born or natural-
ized. As illuminated by the Court, a corporation
is a citizen of the United States in the sense that a corporation organized
under the laws of one of the states is a citizen of that state, but it is not
within the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares that native
born and naturalized citizens of the United States shall be citizens of the
state wherein they reside.191
And although corporations have some rights under the First,192 Fourth,193
and Fifth Amendments,194 they do not have the same rights as actual per-
sons, such as the right against self-incrimination or right to bear arms.195
Second, the federal government likely cannot unilaterally revoke an
individual’s citizenship. In Afroyim v. Rusk,196 the Supreme Court held that
“[o]nce acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be
187. Id. at 678 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872)).
188. Id. at 677 (“Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a
state, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within
the state to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the
United States to be a citizen of the Union.”)).
189. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 716 (quoting Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Consti-
tution (section 1693)); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874) (“Whoever, then, was
one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted,
became ipso facto a citizen—a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons
associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens.”).
190. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884) (“[T]he Citizenship Clause contemplates two sources
of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization.”).
191. Bankers’ Tr. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1916).
192. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
193. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
194. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
195. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88–89 (1974).
196. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the
States, or any other governmental unit.”197 And although Sovereign Citi-
zens believe that “[t]he only way the government will contract with you, is
if you waive your inalienable rights and agree to be UNDER their jurisdic-
tion,”198 citizenship is conferred upon birth or naturalization and cannot be
lost “unless [the citizen] voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”199 More-
over, if the “artificial” person’s citizenship was merely a contractual agree-
ment, UCC § 2-309(2) would permit that indefinite contract to “be termi-
nated at any time by either party”—something that the Government cannot
do.200
Third, if the citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment was
contractual in nature, the Supreme Court’s analysis and holdings in cases
such as Wong Kim Ark would be wholly unnecessary. Instead of deciding
whether a child born in the United States to foreign-born parents “becomes
at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution,”201 the Court would
have asked whether the petitioner in that case was bound by contract or
agreement. Because the Court instead analyzed the issue in terms of the
historical context of birthright citizenship, the Sovereign Citizens’ interpre-
tation is implicitly flawed.
So what about the cases cited for the proposition that the federal gov-
ernment created a second class of citizenship for “artificial” persons? While
it is true “that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established,”202 that distinc-
tion is not the one propagated by Sovereign Citizens. In Chisholm v. Geor-
gia,203 the Supreme Court decided whether the Constitution abrogated a
state’s sovereign immunity in a suit brought by a citizen of another state. In
finding that it did, the Court recounted the history of nations, sovereignty,
and the natural order.204 The Court declared that the State “is an artificial
person,”205 “subordinate to the People,” and that:
197. Id. at 262.
198. The TRUTH 1, supra note 30. R
199. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
200. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268 (“The very nature of our free government makes it completely incon-
gruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another
group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and
does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship,
whatever his creed, color, or race.”).
201. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898).
202. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872)).
203. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XI,
as stated in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
204. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 455–66.
205. Id. at 455.
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The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that
he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which he becomes bound
by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are
formed and authorised by those laws. If one free man, an original sovereign,
may do all this; why may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of
original sovereigns, do this likewise?206
As previously mentioned, Sovereign Citizens take this quote to mean
that a state, as an artificial person created by the People, cannot rule over
them as sovereigns. That view, however, is drawn from isolated words and
phrases. In fact, Chisholm’s holding rested on the notion that once sover-
eignty is relinquished by “We the People” to a government, or by the states
to the federal government, a state cannot continue to claim sovereign immu-
nity.207 And this is exactly what happened when the states ratified the Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Chisholm Court hypo-
thetically questioned whether an entity can make a contract, break it, and
then when called into court, avoid judgment “by declaring I am a Sovereign
State.” The Court’s answer was clear: “Surely not.”208 Accordingly, al-
though a “State [is] considered as subordinate to the People[ ] . . . every-
thing else [is] subordinate to the State,”209 including individual citizens.
2. Privileges or Immunities Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause “pro-
vides, among other things, that a State may not abridge ‘the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States” or deprive ‘any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”210 In obiter dictum, the
Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases stated that these rights likely
include the right to travel, “to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas,”
“[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” and “[t]he right to use the navigable
waters of the United States.”211 These rights, however, are not based on the
Declaration of Independence, as Sovereign Citizens claim. Instead, they
owe “their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws.”212
Looking to the possible list of privileges or immunities in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, the Sovereign Citizens’ Natural Persons theory again falls
206. Id. at 456.
207. Id. at 455.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010).
211. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 36 (1872)).
212. Id. at 79.
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apart. These rights, such as the right to travel or to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, do not make sense if applied only to a “paper strawman.”
Artificial entities cannot travel across state lines or “use the navigable wa-
ters.” They do not have a “life” to protect. Nor can they be produced in
person, which is what habeas corpus literally means.213 And an actual per-
son would have no standing to challenge evidence obtained in violation of
their artificial person’s rights.214 To read such an absurd result into the
Fourteenth Amendment is contrary to common sense, the established ca-
nons of constitutional interpretation, and would improperly nullify Supreme
Court precedent.215
3. Other bases for jurisdiction
“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to ac-
quire, dispose of, and govern territory” within the United States.216 “‘Terri-
torial jurisdiction’ exists as to ‘territory over which a government or a sub-
division thereof, or court, has jurisdiction.’”217 Accordingly, “[e]very citi-
zen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the
allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction,
of the United States.”218 Therefore, it is by virtue of one’s presence in the
United States, absent some diplomatic exception, “that [gives] the Judiciary
power to act.”219
The federal government, however, has limited power to prescribe what
conduct constitutes a federal crime within its territorial bounds. So while
“state criminal laws do not include the jurisdictional elements common in
federal statutes,” “in our federal system, ‘Congress cannot punish felonies
generally,’ [and] it may enact only those criminal laws that are connected to
213. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 n.10 (1950) (quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY 2 (1933) (“Habeas Corpus . . . thou (shalt) have the body (sc. in court). A writ issuing out of a
court of justice . . . requiring the body of a person to be brought before the judge or into the court for the
purpose specified in the writ . . . requiring the body of a person restrained of liberty to be brought before
the judge or into court, that the lawfulness of the restraint may be investigated and determined.” (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
214. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 n.2 (1978) (“[A] person whose Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by a search or seizure, but who is not a defendant in a criminal action in which the
illegally seized evidence is sought to be introduced, would not have standing to invoke the exclusionary
rule to prevent use of that evidence in that action.”).
215. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 327 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“A reading of our Constitution
that would, as a practical effect, stifle litigation as to national rules must be rejected on the basis that the
law forbids the reading of statutes (much less the Constitution) to reach absurd results.”).
216. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
217. Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Territorial Jurisdiction, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
218. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898).
219. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (“[E]xtending constitutional protections be-
yond the citizenry” to an alien by virtue of his or her presence in the United States).
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one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, such as the authority to regu-
late interstate commerce. As a result, most federal offenses include, in addi-
tion to substantive elements, a jurisdictional one[.]”220 Generally, this juris-
dictional element is met through a “hook”; whereby through the Necessary
and Proper Clause221 Congress can punish crimes that involve, among other
provisions, its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce, to regulate bankruptcy and so forth.222 So although
[n]either Congress’ power to criminalize conduct, nor its power to imprison
individuals who engage in that conduct, nor its power to enact laws gov-
erning prisons and prisoners, is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution [, it]
nonetheless possesses broad authority to do each of those things in the
course of “carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers “vested by” the
“Constitution in the Government of the United States[.]”223
As previously discussed, Congress created the lower federal courts
under Article III, Section 1.224 As such, their jurisdiction is limited by both
the Constitution225 and any bounds promulgated by Congress.226 Through
its constitutional power, Congress has enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which dic-
tates that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have original juris-
diction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.”227 Similarly, Congress has granted jurisdiction to the
federal courts of appeals “from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States,” both civil and criminal.228 Despite Sovereign Citizens’
contentions otherwise, federal courts have the statutory authority—granted
by Congress through its constitutional authority—to hear cases over federal
defendants.
220. Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (2016) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 428 (1821)).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”).
222. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 136 (2010) (“[T]o regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, to enforce civil rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to
establish post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so forth.”).
223. Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137.
224. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
225. Id. § 2.
226. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 385–86 (1881) (“While the
appellate power of this Court extends to all cases within the judicial power of the United States, actual
jurisdiction is confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to describe . . . What these powers shall
be, and to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been, proper subjects of legislative
control.”).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2018).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
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4. Conclusion
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not establish a second class of citizenship for “artifi-
cial persons” by virtue of a contract with the federal government. All per-
sons born or naturalized within the United States, and those non-citizens
domiciled in the United States, are subject to its jurisdiction. Moreover,
Congress has the constitutional power to criminalize behavior that falls
within its enumerated legislative powers and has statutorily granted the fed-
eral courts authority to hear and decide federal criminal and civil cases.
C. The financial authority of the U.S. Government and hidden funds
1. Income tax
A tangential, but related, first issue in the Redemption Scheme is the
federal government’s power to tax citizens’ income. Sovereign Citizens
often challenge the government’s authority or the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice’s validity on the ground that a federal income tax is an unconstitutional
direct tax that should be apportioned. This argument, however, has been
roundly rejected by federal courts. Under the Sixteenth Amendment, “Con-
gress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and with-
out regard to any census or enumeration.”229 Congress gave the district
courts jurisdiction “to render such judgments and decrees as may be neces-
sary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.”230
Additionally, Congress has given the federal government the right to
obtain a lien against “all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal” of any person who neglects or refuses to pay their taxes.231 The
United States may enforce this lien by commencing an action in federal
court, joining all parties with an interest in the property, and obtaining a
judicial sale of the real property.232 Furthermore, “the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice is organized to carry out the broad responsibilities of the Secretary of
the Treasury under § 7801(a) of the 1954 Code for the administration and
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.”233 As the Supreme Court has
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
230. 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2018); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1345, 1357 (2018).
231. Id. § 6321 (2018).
232. 26 U.S.C. § 7403 (2018); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 691–92 (1983).
233. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 534 (1971). The Secretary of the Treasury has full
authority to administer and enforce the internal revenue laws and has the power to create an agency to
enforce those laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7801. Its head, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is responsible to
administer and supervise the execution and application of the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7803(a)
(2018).
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directly rejected similar challenges to the federal government’s power,234
courts routinely strike down any challenges to the federal government’s
power to tax citizens’ income as frivolous.235
2. Redeeming the Redemption Scheme
That the Redemption Scheme does not work is beyond dispute. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the U.S. Department of Trea-
sury have explicitly warned individuals not to participate or believe in the
Redemption Scheme. First, the various permutations of the scheme “have
no substance in law or finance.”236 Second, “[t]he creation and presentment
of these documents may be a violation” of federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 514,
“and the person(s) using such fictitious instruments may be subject to crimi-
nal prosecution.”237 Third, “[r]egardless of how such instruments or docu-
ments are titled or whether they appear authentic, they are worthless, have
no legal validity, and are not payable through the United States Treasury,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, or any other
federal or state agency.”238
In effect, because social security numbers and birth certificates do not
evidence hidden accounts, any “bill of exchange drawn on the account and
the subsequent chargeback have no legal effect and are not sufficient either
to create a right to payment or to create an equitable remedy for breach of
performance that gives rise to a right to payment.”239 As for the purported
proof that redemption is possible, neither the Joint Resolution nor Guaranty
Trust permit the redemption of funds in some hidden account.240 House
234. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S.
103 (1916).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting as frivolous
and “shop worn” the argument that an individual is a sovereign citizen of a state who is not subject to
federal taxing authority); Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting as
frivolous arguments concerning the government’s authority to impose income tax and listing repeatedly
rejected arguments).
236. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fraudulent Debt Elimination Schemes, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, https://perma.cc/YM6K-YSX9 (describing “[t]he use of a nonexis-
tent ‘trust account’ supposedly held in a person’s name at the United States Department of the Treasury
or some other part of the federal government” as one of the “fraudulent processes used to . . . ‘eliminate’
debt”).
237. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fictitious Financial Instruments: Worthless Sight
Drafts, Bills of Exchange, Due Bills and Redemption Certificates, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, https://perma.cc/3FEB-7U3A; Bogus Sight Drafts/Bills of Exchange Drawn on the Treasury,
TREASURY DIRECT, https://perma.cc/SJJ4-H2CY (“Drawing [Bills of Exchange] on the U.S. Treasury is
fraudulent and a violation of federal law. The theory behind their use is bogus and incomprehensible.”).
238. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Illegal Financial Activity: Fictitious Debt Elimina-
tion Schemes, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, https://perma.cc/L2TS-N7UC.
239. In re Fachini, 470 B.R. 638, 642 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2012).
240. Bryant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (W.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 282 F. App’x
260 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Most importantly, the alleged legal bases for [a redemption scheme] claim, House
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Joint Resolution 192 dealt with redemption of Liberty Bonds following
World War I,241 and in Guaranty Trust, the Supreme Court held that the
Joint Resolution forbade the enforcement of a provision in certain contracts
that payment of a debt was to be made in Dutch guilders.242
3. The Federal Reserve and Federal Reserve Notes
The remaining tenets of the Redemption Scheme can be broken into
two pieces: (1) the private nature of the Federal Reserve (or alternatively
the Internal Revenue Service), and (2) the validity of Federal Reserve Notes
as legal tender.
First, although Sovereign Citizens believe that the Federal Reserve Act
of December 23, 1913243 created the Federal Reserve as a “private corpora-
tion,” the Federal Reserve Banks are in fact “government instrumentali-
ties”244 that “play as the government’s fiscal agents.”245 And although they
are not government agencies or departments for most purposes,246 the Fed-
eral Reserve’s power stems from Congress, and the activities of member
banks are governmental.247 So “[w]hile savings and loan associations may
in many ways be analogized to private corporations, federal reserve banks,
by contrast, are plainly and predominantly fiscal arms of the federal govern-
ment.”248 The Internal Revenue Service, on the other hand, “is organized to
carry out the broad responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury under
§ 7801(a) of the 1954 Code for the administration and enforcement of the
internal revenue laws.”249 Congress has granted the Secretary of the Trea-
sury authority to administer and enforce the internal revenue laws and has
Joint Resolution 192 and Guaranty Tr. Co. of New York v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939), address
nothing more than the U.S. monetary shift away from the gold standard and provide absolutely no
support for [a plaintiff’s redemption scheme] position.”).
241. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 346–47 (1935).
242. Guaranty Tr. Co., 307 U.S. at 258–59.
243. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2018).
244. Fed. Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 237 (1935); Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis
v. Metrocentre Imp. Dist. No. 1, 657 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 455 U.S. 995 (1982).
245. Scott v. Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City, 406 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2005).
246. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425–26
(1928) (“Instrumentalities like the national banks or the federal reserve banks, in which there are private
interests, are not departments of the government.”).
247. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941) (“It also follows that
when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which the federal government lawfully
acts, the activities of such corporation are governmental.”); Berini v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Eighth Dist., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2005).
248. Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston v. Comm’r of Corps. & Taxation of Com. of Mass., 499 F.2d 60,
62 (1st Cir. 1974).
249. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
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the power to create an agency, such as the Internal Revenue Service, to
enforce those laws.250
Next, Sovereign Citizens claim that Article 1, § 10, clause 1, which
states that “No State shall . . . make anything but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts . . . ,” invalidates the Federal Reserve Note.251
First, Article I, Section 8, clause 5, of the Constitution provides that Con-
gress has the enumerated power “[t]o coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and mea-
sures.”252 “The power to coin money necessarily carries with it the power to
declare what is money, and the constitution does not limit Congress to gold
and silver coin. Section 8 sets forth the powers of Congress, while § 10
imposes a restriction on the states.”253 Second, under 31 U.S.C. § 5103,
Congress has mandated that “United States coins and currency (including
Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and
national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and
dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts.”254 Moreo-
ver, the U.S. Dollar is not backed by “the U.S. citizens themselves . . . as
collateral to pay off [bankruptcy] debt,”255 but rather the collateral assets
that Federal Reserve Banks post in order to obtain the notes.256 These con-
stitutional257 statutes foreclose any Sovereign Citizen argument to the con-
trary.258
4. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve has the statutory authority to print Federal Re-
serve Notes, and acts as a government instrumentality in doing so. No se-
cret trust accounts exist, and the Redemption theory is based on faulty or
limited readings of Supreme Court cases, inapplicable UCC citations, and
overreliance on innocuous capitalization and documents that merely track
citizens’ birth and employment.
250. 26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2018).
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; The TRUTH 3, supra note 85. R
252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
253. In re Yuska, 571 B.R. 424, 428 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2017).
254. 31 U.S.C. § 5103.
255. The TRUTH 3, supra note 85. R
256. 12 U.S.C. § 412 (2018).
257. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495, 495 (9th
Cir. 1976).
258. Rahman El v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., No. 09-CV-10622, 2009 WL 3876506, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 17, 2009) (collecting cases rejecting the argument “that paper money does not have value
because it is not backed by either gold or silver”).
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D. Every citizen’s right to travel (between states
and subject to regulation)
In relying on specific language quoted from state court opinions and
dictionaries, Sovereign Citizens mistakenly believe that their interpretations
of isolated words in dictionaries and cases are binding; however, federal
and state law belie such a narrow interpretation of traveling. Moreover, the
four cases Sovereign Citizens most often cite do not stand for the proposi-
tion that individuals have an unfettered right to travel. In fact, those cases
explicitly assert that the state does have the power to regulate automobiles
of all types and to require a license and registration as a prerequisite to
traveling.259 Lastly, the Supreme Court has unmistakably upheld the consti-
tutionality of police stops and DUI or immigration checkpoints without
probable cause.
1. Specific words
Because a right to travel does not and cannot be based on specific
words derived from dictionary definitions, Sovereign Citizens are left only
with 18 U.S.C. § 31’s definition of “motor vehicle” to support the claim
that only a vehicle used for commerce requires a license. That statute, how-
ever, defines terms used under Title 18 of the United States Code—the
main criminal code of the federal government of the United States. And
because Congress may only “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,”260 Con-
gress necessarily had to define “motor vehicles” used in federal crimes as
things “used for commercial purposes” to satisfy the jurisdictional “hook.”
Under the Constitution, it is the states—not the federal government—that
have the power to regulate vehicles not used in interstate commerce.
2. The actual right to travel
While the four cases often quoted by Sovereign Citizens appear, at
first glance at least, to support an individual’s right to unfettered travel, the
oft-quoted language does not appear verbatim in the record. The most com-
plete quotations even undercut their claims. In Chicago Motor Coach Co. v.
City of Chicago, the Illinois State Supreme Court stated that “[e]ven the
Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the
259. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 132 (1958); Schactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 940–41 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930); Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of
Chicago, 169 N.E. 22, 25 (Ill. 1929).
260. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342
(1914)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or
pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public
interest and convenience.”261 Likewise, Thompson v. Smith, from the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, stated that “[t]he right of a citizen to
travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the
ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under
his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to
pursue happiness and safety.”262 In Kent v. Dulles,263 the United States Su-
preme Court held that “[t]he right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment.”264 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed this holding in Shachtman v. Dulles, stating that “[t]he right to
travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a
natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation
under law.”265
Looking to the context of these cases, however, dispels any assertion
that they establish or confirm an unfettered right to travel without a license
or registration. In Chicago, the court specifically noted that “it has been
uniformly held that the state, in the exercise of the police power, may regu-
late their speed and provide other reasonable rules and restrictions as to
their use.”266 Similarly, the court in Thompson noted that “[t]he right of a
citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual
conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the
city in the interest of public safety and welfare.”267 So while these state
court opinions are not binding interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, they
also do not support the Sovereign Citizens’ selective use of case law to
support an unfettered right to travel.
We next turn to federal case law. Looking to the context in Shachtman,
we find that “[t]he right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of
transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to
reasonable regulation under law.”268 But even this case, being from the
D.C. Circuit, is not the final authority. For that, we look to Kent and other
Supreme Court cases on the right to travel. In Kent, the Court did state that
“[t]he right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be
261. Chicago Motor Coach, 169 N.E. at 25, abrogated by American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, No. 72315, 1992 WL 356097 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1992).
262. Thompson, 154 S.E. at 583.
263. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
264. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
265. Shachtman, 225 F.2d at 941.
266. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 169 N.E. at 25.
267. Thompson, 154 S.E. at 579.
268. Shachtman, 225 F.2d at 941(emphasis added).
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deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”269
This statement was made, however, in the context of whether the Secretary
of State had the statutory authority to promulgate regulations denying pass-
ports (he did not).270 And in that case, the Court’s sole issue was whether
Congress had authorized the curtailment of the right to travel through the
issuing of passports.271
In Hendrick v. State of Maryland,272 the Supreme Court addressed the
very right to travel (absent state regulation) that Sovereign Citizens seek to
invoke.273 “[A] state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary
for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of
all motor vehicles, those moving in interstate commerce as well as
others.”274 Such regulations are “but an exercise of the police power uni-
formly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preserva-
tion of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens.”275 In later cases, the
Court has repeatedly affirmed the states’ power in this realm.276 Unfortu-
nately for Sovereign Citizens, this binding interpretation confirms that a
state may require a license, registration, or other documentation, regardless
of whether the vehicle is used for commerce or private purposes.
Where then, does the Constitution’s guaranteed right to travel protect a
citizen? In Saenz v. Roe,277 the Court expounded upon citizens’ fundamen-
tal and constitutional right to travel:
The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to
leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for
269. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125.
270. Id. at 127.
271. Id. (“Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen’s ‘liberty.’ We need not
decide the extent to which it can be curtailed. We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which
Congress has authorized its curtailment.”).
272. 235 U.S. 610 (1915).
273. Id. at 622.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36 (1941) (“The use of the public highways by motor vehicles,
with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The uni-
versal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate
means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect
others using the highway is consonant with due process.”); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927)
(“Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is
attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and
enforce regulations reasonable calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents
alike, who use its highways.”).
277. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be
treated like other citizens of that State.278
The first right (of ingress and egress), which is not found in the Consti-
tution but “was expressly mentioned in the text of the Articles of Confeder-
ation, may simply have been ‘conceived from the beginning to be a neces-
sary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created.’”279 “The
second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly protected by
the text of the Constitution.”280 Pointing to Article IV, § 2,281 the Court
held that “by virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State
who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his jour-
ney, is entitled to enjoy the ‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States’ that he visits.”282 The third right “of the newly arrived citi-
zen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the
same State,” is protected by an individual’s state citizenship as well as U.S.
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.283 These rights therefore pro-
tect individuals from certain state actions, such as being taxed at state bor-
ders,284 or being subject to durational residence requirements for eligibility
for nonemergency free medical care285 and certain forms of public assis-
tance.286 The right to travel does not, however, protect citizens from being
stopped by state police for speeding or driving without the required docu-
mentation.
3. Border and DUI checkpoints
Having established the Supreme Court’s view of constitutionally valid
exercises of state power over traveling, I next examine whether police must
articulate their reasonable suspicion of a crime being violated and whether
DUI and border checkpoints are an unlawful form of taxation.287
a. Reasonable articulable suspicion
“An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose
all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its
278. Id. at 500.
279. Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 748 (1966)).
280. Id.
281. “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.”
282. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
283. Id. at 502 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
284. Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
285. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974).
286. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
287. Sovereign Right to Operate, supra note 124. R
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use are subject to government regulation.”288 Thus under the Fourth
Amendment, “[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an
automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited
purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons[.]’”289 In Delaware v. Prouse,
the Supreme Court addressed whether police may pull over vehicles at ran-
dom to check for a driver’s license or registration absent probable cause.
Holding that police may not, the Court stated:
[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reason-
able suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to
seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver
in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.290
The Court also limited this holding, however, by affirming the states’
right to “spot check” or question “all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops[.]”291 In other words, although police may not randomly pull over
vehicles absent an articulable and reasonable suspicion of some wrongdo-
ing, it may randomly inspect vehicles at a check point.
But do police have to articulate their reasonable suspicion to the
driver? In United States v. Sokolow,292 the Supreme Court held that an of-
ficer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and un-
particularized suspicion or hunch. The Fourth Amendment requires some
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”293 Moreover,
an investigative detention based on reasonable articulable detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop.294 But the required articulation is reviewed only after the stop to
determine whether the stop was justified. The Court further elaborated on
this holding in Whren v. United States, holding that the reasonable, articul-
able suspicion is viewed objectively, and does not depend “on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”295 Therefore, the articula-
tion (or lack thereof) at the time of the stop does not matter, because courts
will review the police action under the totality of the circumstances. In fact,
police officers can lie about the reason they stop a driver.296
288. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
289. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).
290. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
293. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
294. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
295. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
296. United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016).
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In Devenpeck v. Alford,297 the Court rejected a citizen’s constitutional
right to have an officer articulate the reason for arrest during the arrest.298
“While it is assuredly good police practice to inform a person of the reason
for his arrest at the time he is taken into custody, we have never held that to
be constitutionally required.”299 The time to challenge the police officer’s
actions come later, in court.300 In light of the Court’s holding in Whren—
that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stop does not depend on
actual motivations of the individual officers involved—Devenpeck’s ratio-
nale likely extends to traffic stops.301 For if no reason is required during
arrest, it seems fair to assume that no reason would be required during a
temporary detention, as the invasion of a person’s liberty is less intrusive
during a traffic stop than it is during an arrest. Accordingly, there does not
appear to be support under the U.S. Constitution for the proposition that
police officers need inform a driver of their reasonable and articulable basis
for a traffic stop.
b. DUI and border checkpoints
As to the constitutional validity of DUI and border checkpoints, the
Supreme Court has been clear. In Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz,302 the Court addressed “the initial stop of each motorist passing
through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and obser-
vation by checkpoint officers.”303 By balancing “the State’s interest in
preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably
be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual
motorists who are briefly stopped,” the Court held that DUI or sobriety
checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.304 Following a sim-
ilar balancing test in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held “that
stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent [border patrol]
checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be
authorized by warrant.”305 In sum, the U.S. Constitution does not protect
drivers from being stopped at DUI or border checkpoints for limited, inves-
tigatory stops.
297. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
298. Id. at 155.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 155 n.3.
301. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
302. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
303. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450–51.
304. Id. at 455.
305. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Voicing concerns over the federal government’s overreach into citi-
zens’ lives, Sovereign Citizens make the unfortunate mistake of relying on
non-binding or irrelevant legal definitions and misreading judicial opinions
to avoid regulation or invoke rights that have no basis in law. The Supreme
Court, as final arbiter of federal constitutional law and rights, has repeatedly
upheld the federal courts’ jurisdiction over adjudication of federal crimes
by citizens. Citizens of the United States, born or naturalized, cannot chal-
lenge the courts’ jurisdiction by invoking their own sovereignty or fringe on
a flag. To the contrary, all citizens are subject to the courts’ jurisdiction and
their conduct—be it driving or paying taxes—can be regulated by the state
and federal government without a citizen’s consent. Accordingly, courts
have routinely denied every Sovereign Citizen claim involving a lack of
jurisdiction,306 the Redemption Scheme,307 the right to travel,308 and fringe
on flags,309 as proof that their claims are unavailing as law. But despite
having no basis in the law, the courts and civil servants should nevertheless
rebut Sovereign Citizen claims with the actual law of the United States.
These Americans—albeit misguided and ill-informed—honestly believe
that they have found the key to challenging government overreach. In real-
ity, they have only purchased snake oil that is bound to ensure more gov-
ernment reach into their lives. As such, it is the legal community’s duty to
inform them of their actual rights under the Constitution and thereby avert
more violent or pseudolegal responses.
306. See Appendix I.
307. See Appendix II. .
308. See Appendix III.
309. See Appendix IV.
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States Inc., No. 17-cv-01807, 2017 WL 5905281 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2017);
Sundsmo v. Burch, No. 15-cv-2-jdp, 2017 WL 432840 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 31,
2017); Moose v. Krueger, No. 1:16–cv–01403–JBM, 2016 WL 7391513
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2016); Ellis v. Krueger, No. 1:16-cv-01437-JBM, 2016
WL 6839347 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2016); Bowman Bey v. Krueger, No. 16-
1412, 2016 WL 6783194 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2016); United States v. Brown,
No. 13 CR 650-1, 2015 WL 7077244 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2015); Bey v.
United States, No. 1:16–cv–01403–JBM, 2016 WL 6238489 (C.D. Ill. Oct.
25, 2016); Gregerson v. Wisconsin, No. 15-cv-549-wmc, 2016 WL
5794811 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 4, 2016); Ladyman v. Meade, No. 3:14 CV 2038,
2016 WL 5466301 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2016); United States v. Stuart, No.
10–CR–288, 2015 WL 5084403 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 27, 2015); McLendon v.
Schwartz, No. 15–cv–586–DRH, 2015 WL 3823718 (S.D. Ill. June 19,
2015); United States v. Bell, No. 13 CR 949–1, 2015 WL 2089000 (N.D.
Ill. May 1, 2015); Cruse v. Boey, No. 15–cv–302–DRH, 2015 WL 1726639
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2015); Sundsmo v. Garrigan, No. 13–cv–682–jdp, 2015
WL 1714365 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 15, 2015); Delatorre v. United States, No. 13
C 1355, 2015 WL 1176820 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2015); Dudley v. Eggert, No.
1:14–cv–1061–SLD–JEH, 2014 WL 4098141 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2014);
Johnson v. Superintendent, No. 3:14–cv–01546–PPS, 2014 WL 2154421
(N.D. Ind. May 22, 2014); United States v. Jones, No. 11 CR 879, 2014 WL
539384 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2014); United States v. Sanders, No.
12–cv–96–WDS–SCW, 2013 WL 5567421 (S.D. Ill. May 3, 2013); John-
son v. United States, No. 11–cv–288–DRH, 2013 WL 1728278 (S.D. Ill.
Apr. 20, 2013); Westby Co-Op Credit Union v. Hertler, No.
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12–cv–811–wmc, 2012 WL 6195992 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2012); McDon-
ald-Bey v. Springer, No. 1:12–CV–120, 2012 WL 1424937 (N.D. Ind. Apr.
24, 2012); Golden Ali v. Centralized Infractions Bureau, No.
1:12–CV–53–TLS, 2012 WL 1301239 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2012); Bank of
New York Mellon ex rel. CIT Mortg. Tr. 2007-1 v. Glavin, No.
10–cv–765–slc, 2011 WL 1791599 (W.D. Wis. May 10, 2011); Capital
One Bank v. Glavin, No. 10–cv–617–slc, 2011 WL 1211512 (W.D. Wis.
Mar. 31, 2011); M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Glavin, No.
10–cv–616–slc, 2011 WL 322663 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 31, 2011); United States
v. Johnson, No. 09–CR–20049–DRH, 2009 WL 3672075 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 28,
2009); United States v. Delatorre, No. 03 CR 90, 2008 WL 312647 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 30, 2008); United States v. Kriemelmeyer, No. 07-CR-052-C-01,
2007 WL 5479293 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2007); Young v. I.R.S., 596 F.
Supp. 141 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
Eighth Circuit
United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Har-
din, 489 F. App’x 984 (8th Cir. 2012) (mem.); United States v. Mooney,
No. 16–cv–2547 (SRN/LIB), 2017 WL 2352002 (D. Minn. May 31, 2017);
Fullilove v. Glass, No. 4:16CV2143 PLC, 2017 WL 1549776 (E.D. Minn.
Apr. 28, 2017); Waldorf v. Dayton, No. 17–107 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL
1134578 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2017); Fisherman v. Minnesota, No. 16-cv-
2594-DSD-KMM, 2016 WL 7159503 (D. Minn. Nov. 11, 2016); Smith v.
M.P. Conway, No. 15–4286, 2016 WL 4727443 (JNE/SER), 2016 WL
4727443 (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2016); United States v, Garcia, No. 15–cr–260
(PAM/TNL), 2016 WL 9131461 (D. Minn. May 9, 2016); Howard v. James
B. Nutter & Co., No. 4:16CV336 CDP, 2016 WL 1305109 (E.D. Mo. Apr.
4, 2016); Flanagan v. United States, No. 4:13–CV–2090–RWS, 2014 WL
1315230 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2014); Citi Mortg., Inc. v. Hubbard, No.
13–144 (JRT/JSM), 2014 WL 1303706 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2014); Abarca
v. United States, No. 4:13CV1573 SNLJ, 2013 WL 4459016 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 19, 2013); United States v. Reed, No. 4:12CR373 AGF (DDN), 2013
WL 11762139 (E.D. Mo. May 2, 2013); United States v. Koss, No.
12–00133–01–CR–W–HFS, 2013 WL 593478 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 2013);
United States v. Hobbs, No. 4:12CR14AGF(MLM), 2012 WL 2458425
(E.D. Mo. May 15, 2012); Duwenhoegger v. King, No. 10–3965 (PJS/
JSM), 2012 WL 1516865 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2012); United States v. Good-
rich, No. 09–00353–10–CR–W–ODS, 2012 WL 7660134 (W.D. Mo. Feb.
10, 2012); Arnold v. United States, No. 1:07CV00160 ERW, 2007 WL
4210475 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Knudson, No.
4:CV96–3275, 1997 WL 165689 (D. Neb. Apr. 8, 1997).
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Ninth Circuit
United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. Nevada,
No. 2:17-CV-645 JCM (CWH), 2017 WL 5947374 (D. Nev. Nov. 30,
2017); United States v. Agustin-Simon, No. CV 16-2715-PHX-DGC
(ESW), 2017 WL 5176683 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2017); Bendeck v. U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, No. 17-00180 JMS-RLP, 2017 WL 2726692 (D. Haw. June 23,
2017); Bendeck v. Workman, No. 17-00180 JMS-RLP, 2017 WL 1758079
(D. Haw. May 4, 2017); Woodruff v. Villalobos, No. 1:16-CV-1170 AWI
EPG, 2016 WL 4368004 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2016); Mackey v. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 1:15-cv-1934-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 3254037 (E.D. Cal. June
14, 2016); United States v. Alexio, Nos. 13-01017 JMS-BMK, 13-01018
JMS-BMK, 2016 WL 1559135 (D. Haw. Apr. 18, 2016); Williams v. Sche-
ingart, No. C 15-3013 MMC, 2015 WL 7351388 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
2015); DIRECTV, L.C.C. v. Scott, No. 2:14–cv–2563–JAM–KJN PS, 2015
WL 4645333 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015); United States v. Alexio, Nos.
13–01017 JMS, 13–01018 JMS, 2015 WL 4069160 (D. Haw. July 2, 2015);
Rice v. City of Boise City, No. 1:13–cv–00441–CWD, 2013 WL 6385657
(D. Idaho Dec. 6, 2013); Robertson v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc., No.
CV–12–8033–PCT–LOA, 2012 WL 4840033 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2012);
Kelly v. Eckert, No. 03:11–cv–00949–HU, 2011 WL 5287339 (D. Or. Sept.
14, 2011); Quigley v. Geithner, No. 1:09–CV–293–REB, 2010 WL
3613901 (D. Idaho Sept. 8, 2010); Heitman v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n,
No. CV07–210–E–BLW, 2007 WL 4224053 (D. Idaho Nov. 27, 2007);
Heitman v. Bear Lake West Home Owners Ass’n Corp., No.
CV–07–209–E–BLW, 2007 WL 4198254 (D. Idaho Nov. 21, 2007); Heit-
man v. Stone Creek Funding Corp., No. CV–07–150–E–BLW, 2007 WL
3333279 (D. Idaho Nov. 7, 2007); United States v. Stowbunenko-Sait-
schenko, No. CR 06–0869–PHX–DGC, 2007 WL 865392 (D. Ariz. Mar.
20, 2007); Ray v. Williams, No. CV–04–863–HU, 2005 WL 697041 (D.
Or. Mar. 24, 2005); Sherwood v. United States, No. C–96–2223–JSB, 1996
WL 732512 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 1996).
Tenth Circuit
Carroll v. Moorehead, 710 F. App’x 346 (10th Cir. 2018) (mem.); United
States v. Palmer, 699 F. App’x 836 (10th Cir. 2017) (mem.); Charlotte v.
Hansen, 433 F. App’x 660 (10th Cir. 2011); Rollins v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
240 F. App’x 800 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hansen, No.
2:16–cr–534–CW–PMW, 2017 WL 2859929 (D. Utah July 5, 2017);
Palmer v. United States, No. 2:16–cv–987, 2017 WL 1533447 (D. Utah
Apr. 27, 2017); United States v. Pflum, No. 14-40062-01-DDC, 2016 WL
7242506 (D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2016); Herlocker v. Loffswold, No. 16-2300-
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JAR-TJJ, 2016 WL 5851732 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2016); United States v. Ri-
vera, No. CIV 14–0579 JB/CG, 2015 WL 4042197 (D.N.M. June 30,
2015); United States v. Markham, No. 14–10089–JTM, 2015 WL 338967
(D. Kan. Jan. 23, 2015); United States v. Russian, No.
14–CR–10018–EFM, 2014 WL 970066 (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 2014); Utah
Dep’t of Workforce Serv. v. Geddes, No. 2:13–CV–24 TS, 2013 WL
1367025 (D. Utah Apr. 4, 2013); United States v. Hopkins, No. CIV
11–0416 JB/WPL, 2013 WL 684652 (D.N.M. Feb. 14, 2013); United States
v. Jordan, Nos. 06–40160–03–JAR, 12–4047–JAR, 2013 WL 328973 (D.
Kan. Jan. 29, 2013); Giron v. Chase Home Mortg. Fin., LLC, No. Civ. 12-
033 MV/RHS, 2012 WL 13001851 (D.N.M. June 13, 2012); Richmond v.
Wampanoag Tribal Court Cases, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (D. Utah 2006);
Stamps v. Dieter, Nos. Civ.A. 02–K–956, Civ.A. 02–K–1510, 2002 WL
31476646 (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2002); In re Tax Indebtedness of Brown, No.
C–84–651A, 1984 WL 1356 (D. Utah Nov. 26, 1984).
Eleventh Circuit
Trevino v. Florida, 687 F. App’x 861 (11th Cir. 2017) (mem.); Walker v.
Florida, 688 F. App’x 864 (11th Cir. 2017) (mem.); United States v. Gib-
son, 633 F. App’x 713 (11th Cir. 2015) (mem.); United Stated v. Davis, 586
F. App’x 534 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.); United States v. Sellors, 572 F.
App’x 628 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.); Linge v. State of Georgia Inc., 569 F.
App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.); United States v. Davis, 549 F. App’x
924 (11th Cir. 2013) (mem.); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228 (11th
Cir. 2013); Frye v. Barbour, No: 2:16–cv–832–FtM–29MRM, 2017 WL
4226531 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2017); Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
(FDOC), No. 2:17-cv-321-FtM-99MRM, 2017 WL 3782802 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 31, 2017); Jones v. Georgia, No. 7:17-cv-00116-HL-TQL, 2017 WL
3687657 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2017); Gibson v. United States, No. 1:13-CR-
440-TWT-JSA, 2017 WL 4544432 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2017); Mathis v.
Jones, No. 1:15cv130/WTH/CJK, 2017 WL 5633263 (N.D. Fla. June 19,
2017); Greaves v. Mann, No. 1:16-cv-3090-WSD, 2017 WL 510894 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 8, 2017); United States v. Whetstone, 1:09-cr-216-WSD, 2016 WL
6944165 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2016); Morales v. United States, No.
6:15–cv–636–Orl–37KRS, 2016 WL 6582736 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2016);
Dirden v. Jones, No. 3:15cv412/RV/EMT, 2016 WL 7007547 (N.D. Fla.
Oct. 21, 2016); Trevino v. Florida, No: 6:15–cv–2036–Orl–41DAB, 2016
WL 9444258 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2016); Taylor v. Adduci, No. 7:15-CV-
1301-JHH-JHE, 2016 WL 3916101 (N.D. Ala. July 20, 2016); Davis v.
Fuller, No. 2:15cv169–MHT, 2015 WL 1729379 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 15,
2015); Davis v. Bone, No. 2:15–CV–010–WKW, 2015 WL 1565010 (M.D.
Ala. Apr. 8, 2015); Martin v. United States, No. 6:13-cv-8-Orl-22GJK,
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2015 WL 13285000 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2015); United States v. Garringer,
No. 1–14–CR–287–SCJ, 2014 WL 6990309 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2014);
Santiago v. Century 21/PHH Mortg., No. 1:12–CV–02792–KOB, 2013 WL
1281776 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2013); United States v. Gundy, No. CR 313-
004, 2013 WL 12212917 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2013); United States v. Perkins,
No. 1:10–cr–97–1–JEC–LTW, 2013 WL 3820716 (N.D. Ga. July 23,
2013); Unites States v. Cartman, No. 1:10–cr–512–01–JEC, 2013 WL
2445158 (N.D. Ga. June 5, 2013); United States v. Baxley, No. 1:13cv38/
MCR/GRJ, 2013 WL 5429301 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2013); United States v.
Dowis, No. 2:12-CR-030-RWS-JCF, 2013 WL 12169389 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
28, 2013); Nunn v. United States, No. 3:13cv12–MHT, 2013 WL 1099321
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2013); Rufus v. Chapman, No. 3:11–CV–74 (CAR),
2012 WL 4394640 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2012); United States v. Cordell, No.
4:09–CR–006–CAP–WEJ, 2011 WL 2581018 (N.D. Ga. May 23, 2011);
Aboyade-Cole Bey v. BankAtlantic, No. 6:09–cv–1572–Orl–31GJK, 2010
WL 3069102 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010); United States v. Luman, No. Civ.
104CV02624CC, 2005 WL 1027075 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2005); Ruble v.
I.R.S., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
Court of Federal Claims
Mitchell v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 286 (Fed. Cl. 2018); Thomas-Bey v.
United States, No. 17–1127C, 2017 WL 6422168 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 18, 2017);
Davenport v. United States, No. 17–1122C, 2017 WL 5988354 (Fed. Cl.
Dec. 4, 2017); Elleby v. United States, No. 17–351C, 2017 WL 5034471
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 3, 2017); Bechard v. United States, No. 16–1177C (Pro Se),
2017 WL 486946 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 6, 2017); Price v. United States, 123 Fed.
Cl. 560 (Fed. Cl. 2015); Headen v. United States, No. 14–673T, 2014 WL
5544093 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 3, 2014); Miles v. United States, Nos. 14–416C;
14–417C; 14–418C; 14–419C & 14–420C, 2014 WL 5020574 (Fed. Cl.
Oct. 6, 2014); Rivera v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 644 (Fed. Cl. 2012);
Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 306 (Fed. Cl. 2012); Gravatt v.
United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279 (Fed. Cl. 2011); Davis v. United States, No.
09-862C, 2010 WL 1685907 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 22, 2010); Fuce v. United
States, No. 06–269 T, 2006 WL 2808072 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 25, 2006); Withers
v. United States, No. 06-64C, 2006 WL 5640831 (Fed. Cl. June 14, 2006).
Federal Circuit
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 757 (Cl. Ct. 1987),
rev’d, 857 F.2d 1448 (Fed Cir. 1988).
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Tax Court
Harris v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-275, 2012 WL 4464549 (2012).
D.C. Circuit
Magritz v. Ozaukee Cty., No. 12–806 (EGS), 2012 WL 3744724 (D.C.
Aug. 30, 2012); Maxwell v. Snow, 409 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Manson
v. United States, No. 00CV00272, 2001 WL 241799 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2,
2001); Ellena v. Flournoy, No. 92–1263, 1992 WL 234977 (D.C. Aug. 26,
1992).
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United States v. Sayer, 450 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2006).
Second Circuit
United States v. Li, 115 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Blusal
Meats, Inc., 817 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10950(SAS),
2009 WL 185995 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009); 9Oak Beverages, Inc. v. Tomra
of Mass., L.L.C., 6 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
Third Circuit
United States v. Thach, 411 F. App’x 485 (3d Cir. 2011); Monroe v. Beard,
536 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2008); Lewicki v. Washington Cty., 431 F. App’x
205 (3d Cir. 2001); Belt v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:CV–10–2339, 2011
WL 13196525 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2011); Rousseau v. U.S. Dep’t of Trea-
sury, No. 04–4368 (MLC), 2010 WL 457702 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010); In re
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Fourth Circuit
United States v. Able, No. 3:09–537–JFA–PJG, 2010 WL 2431013 (D.S.C.
Mar. 26, 2010).
Sixth Circuit
United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119 (6th Cir. 1994), superseded by regula-
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 3A1.1, as stated in United States v. McCaster, 333 F.
App’x 970 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bahhur, 200 F.3d 917 (6th Cir.
2000); Elfelt v. United States, 149 F. App’x 402 (6th Cir. 2005) (mem.); In
re Sadler, No. 1:14CV2312, 2015 WL 9474174 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 29, 2015);
Siddle v. Crants, No. 3:09–0175, 2010 WL 424906 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 25,
2010); Zebari v. Pepsi Bottling Co., No. 05-CV-72924, 2007 WL 1675178
(E.D. Mich. June 11, 2007).
Seventh Circuit
United States v. Dilley, No. 1:08–CR–37, 2009 WL 1564389 (N.D. Ind.
June 3, 2009); United States v. Manasrah, 347 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Wis.
2004); Shapo v. O’Shaughnessy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
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Small ex rel. Day Surgicenters, Inc. v. Sussman, No. 94 C 5200, 1995 WL
153327 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 1995); First Nat’l Bank of Chicago as Tr. of Insti-
tutional Real Estate Fund F v. ACCO USA, Inc.-IBT Ret. Plan, 842 F.
Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1994); In re Carter, 312 B.R. 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2004).
Eighth Circuit
Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Comm’r, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973); Resolution Tr.
Corp. v. Bermel Inv. Co., No. 3–90–448, 1991 WL 557610 (D. Minn. May
1, 1991); Justice v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1988); In re
Lally, 51 B.R. 204 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); In re Lally, 38 B.R. 622
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
Ninth Circuit
United States v. Van Krieken, 39 F.3d 227 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by
statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212, as stated in United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d
893 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.
1993); Dupnik v. United States, 848 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Call, No. 2:09–cr–00079–KJD–RJJ, 2009 WL 6047137 (D. Nev.
Nov. 24, 2009); In re Larson, 99 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989).
Tenth Circuit
United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1993).
Eleventh Circuit
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Conrad, No. 1:16–CV–02572–LMM, 2017 WL
3500364 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2017); United States v. Jenkins, No.
1:11–CR–27 (WLS), 2013 WL 3245206 (M.D. Ga. June 26, 2013); United
States v. Sellers, No. 5:11–cv–326–RS–CJK, 2013 WL 3746102 (N.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2013); First Fin. Bank v. CS Assets, L.L.C., No. 08–0731–WS–M,
2010 WL 114531 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2010).
Tax Court
Estate of Holtzin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-299 (1995); Pelton Steel
Casting Co. v. Comm’r, 28 T.C. 153 (1957); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 432 (1951).
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Nash v. Taylor, No. 5:12CV00077, 2012 WL 7766385 (W.D. W.Va. Dec.
5, 2012).
Fifth Circuit
Sochia v. United States, No. Civ.A.SA–04–CA–0612, 2004 WL 1790170
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2004); Sochia v. Fed. Republic’s Cent. Gov’t, No. SA-
06-CA-1006-XR, 2006 WL 3372509 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2006).
Sixth Circuit
Matthews v. United States, No. 3:16cv00148, 2016 WL 2624974 (S.D.
Ohio May 9, 2016).
Seventh Circuit
Szach v. Village of Lindenhurst, No. 14 C 7441, 2015 WL 3964237 (N.D.
Ill. June 25, 2015).
Ninth Circuit
Vazquez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 2:15-cv-756-JAM-EFB PS, 2016 WL
232332 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016).
Tenth Circuit
Secor v. Oklahoma, No. 16–CV–85–JED–PJC, 2016 WL 6156316 (N.D.
Okla. Oct. 21, 2016).
Eleventh Circuit
Hyppolite v. Broward Sheriff’s Office, No. 16-61215-Civ-COOKE/
TORRES, 2017 WL 2691978 (S.D. Fla. June 2017).
California
Halajian v. D & B Towing, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4,
2012).
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Hawai’i
State v. French, 883 P.2d 644 (Haw. App. 1994).
Ohio
Mt. Vernon v. Young, No. 2005CA000045, 2006 WL 1781478 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 28, 2006); Ralph v. Behr, No. 16 CA 42, 2017 WL 1464838
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